“The final result must be the extermination of the Armenian race.”
(Schuekri Bey)
The Armenian Genocide 1915/16 from the Files of the German Foreign Office
Edition I
Revised and Extended Edition of the Collection of Diplomatic Documents published by Johannes Lepsius in 1919 under the Title: ”Germany and Armenia“
Assistant: Sigrid Gust
Translated by: Vera Draack
The fact of the genocide plays an important role in the current discussion on the recognition of the Armenian genocide, because Turkey denies the genocide, respectively makes out acts of revenge by the Armenians, especially in 1917, to be a Turkish genocide by the Armenians (this will be the topic of the coming edition). That is why this guide concentrates on proving the genocide of 1915, which was largely completed by 1916, as well as the background on this genocide, insofar as it comes to light from the files.
For Johannes Lepsius, the genocide of 1915 and 1916 was also in the foreground; thus, this guide in its perceptions does not go far beyond that which the editor Lepsius summed up in his introduction. Only the chapter on Germany’ s role contains new emphases. For those readers with no knowledge of German, however, this guide is an important supplement to the references which come, for the most part, from American sources, because Lepsius’ book, “ Germany and Armenia” has not been translated into English or at least never published in English..
The numerous documents which Lepsius published on the Caucasian campaign are not taken into account in this guide (they are dealt with in the introduction to a later Caucasian edition), nor those on the German relief organisations and their problems, which play a relatively large role in the Lepsius edition.
The testimonials of German diplomats and the German witnesses enlisted by them are in the foreground of the passages quoted. Eye witness reports and the testimonials of Armenians are only added if they have been specifically or tacitly confirmed by German diplomats. This is by no means evidence of a lack of confidence in what is certainly the most important and vivid testimony given by Armenians. This weighting is only meant as preventive action against those who describe the statements made by Armenians as being less credible because they are very prejudiced.
Only a short chapter has been devoted to the German attitude on the Armenian genocide, because the basis in the Lepsius documents is too narrow. It will be treated in full in the next edition.
If the name of the document is printed in bold, an English translation of the original document is available. The original document opens up when the name of the document is clicked on.
Contents
Chapter 1: From the Outbreak of War until the Revolt in Van
(I) Co-existence between the Turks and the Armenians
1) The Armenians’ relationship to the Young Turks after this group came into power
2) Turkish repressions against the Armenians since the spring of 1915
3) Disarming and desertion of the Armenian soldiers
(II) Supposed and Actual Armenian Revolts
1) The events in Zeitun
2) The events in Dörtyol
3) The revolt in Van
Chapter 2: Deportations and Acts of Annihilation
(I) Der 24. April 1915
(II) The Geographical Expansion of the Deportations
(III) Forced Conversions to Islam
(IV) The Deportations as far as the Collection Points
1) The Deportation Trains
2) Isolation of Those Men able to defend Themselves in Labour Battalions
3) Separation and Annihilation of the Armenian Men
4) The Fate of the Women and Girls
5) The Annihilation of Entire Trains
Digression: The Fate of the Catholics and Protestants
(V) From the Collection Points to the Death Camps
1) The Collection Points
2) The Death Trains along the Euphrates River
a) Settlement Attempts
b) The Death Marches in the South and South-East
c) Acts of Annihilation
Chapter 3: Pretexts for the Genocide and Defences
(I) The Pretexts
1) Sympathy for the Entente
2) Accusation of Treason against the Armenians
(II) The Defences
Chapter 4: The Policy of the Final Solution
(I) The Collision Course
1) The Policy of the Young Turks
2) The Role of the Turkish Military
(II) The Motives for the Annihilation of the Armenians
1) Gains
2) The Will of the Turkish Hardliners to Destroy
(III) The Dimension of the Genocide
(IV) The Statistics on the Genocide
(V) Covering Up and Denying the Genocide
Chapter 5: Those Responsible for the Genocide
(I) The Initiators
1) The Leadership in Constantinople
2) The Role of the Young Turks
3) Those Responsible in the Provinces
a) The Agitators
b) The Moderates
(II) The Executives
1) Government Agencies
2) The Military
3) The Gendarmes
4) Special Organisations and Ethnos
(III) Turkish resistance to the Deportations
Chapter 6: The role of the Germans
(I) Germany and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire
1) Antipathy of the Armenian Population towards Germany
2) Search for Refugee by the Armenian Clergy
3) Political Pressure on the Armenians
(II) Germany’s Position with Regard to the Deportations
1) Approval to the Deportations
2) The Principe of Non-Intervention in Turkish Politics
3) Disapproval of the Genocide by Germans in Turkey
(III) Germany and the Consequences of the Genocide
1) Germany’s Economic Interests in Turkey
2) The Public in Germany
3) The People of the World
(IV) Germany’s Joint Responsibility for the Genocide
1) Statements on German Involvement in the Genocide
2) Protests against German Involvement in the Genocide
3) German Settlement Plans for Armenians along the Baghdad Railway Line?
4) The Baghdad Railway and its Armenian Employees
(V) German Attempts at Justification
(VI) The German Military
In Turkish history, 20 April 1915 is considered to be the reason for the strong action taken against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and this portrayal was accepted, although only officially, by the Germans. According to the Turkish portrayal, the Armenians in the eastern Armenian metropolis of Van revolted on this day against the Turkish government and, thus, attacked the fighting troops from the rear. The logical consequence was the evacuation of the Armenians from those regions close to the front.
Although official German policy at that time agreed to this version, to which the Turkish people have adhered until the present, reports of German observers did not. This version was accepted by only a few diplomats and for only a few weeks, as it was not possible to observe the situation in Van personally, for the German Empire did not have consular representation in Van, nor did it have much contact with the German and Swiss representatives of relief organisations there. Soon, the impression of the German diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire was that the Turkish government was merely using the real or supposed revolt of the Armenians in Van as an excuse to deport and exterminate the Armenians.
For already before 20 April 1915, rigorous measures were taken by the Turks against the Armenians and these were described by the German observers. Until the obvious outbreak of the Armenian genocide the Germans’ relationship to the new Turkey of the Young Turks as well as speculations on Russian intentions and the Armenians’ reactions to this was at the foreground of German interest.
The Armenians, the most important minority in the Ottoman Empire, apart from the Greeks, had suffered greatly under Turkish rulership in the past, especially in the period from 1894 until 1896, when hundreds of thousands of Armenians were killed in massacres. However, since the Young Turks had taken over power the climate between the two ethnic groups had improved noticeably. Several German sources go into this new situation.
In a report on the beginning of 1915, the German journalist, von Tyszka, writes:
After the outbreak of war, the relationship of the two peoples towards each other changed. Vice-Consul Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who stood in as administrator for Consul Edgar Anders while he was in Russian captivity, reported from Erzerum in connection with the “purges”:
After the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks in the Middle Ages until the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, Armenians, like all Christians, were not allowed to use weapons in military service. After only a few years of equal rights, the Turkish government again limited admittance to military service. Scheubner-Richter reports from Erzerum:
Shortly after Turkey had entered the war on our side, in October 1914, we already received the news from the Consul in Aleppo that the military conscription of the Armenians would be subject to great difficulties ... The complaints lodged about desertions and switching of numerous Armenians to the Russian side were ever increasing.
In spring, events took place in several towns in the Ottoman Empire which were regarded by one side as being Armenian revolts and by other sides as inconsequentialities or purely defence on the part of the Armenians. German sources, in particular, give a great deal of information on the events in Zeitun (known today as Süleymanli, north of Marash) and in the coastal town of Dörtyol. German diplomatic representatives were not present in Van, but because of the importance of the occurrences there, German sources often speak of them.
Zeitun is a town north of Marash, known today as Kahramanmaras, which has always been populated by Armenians. It made history, because for a long time it held a semi-autonomous status. Its inhabitants, exclusively Armenians, had always proven themselves to be particularly ready to show active resistance and withstood Turkish sieges several times. This won them the admiration of all the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the hatred of the Turks.
Ambassador Wangenheim reports in the middle of April 1915:
Armenian deserters had also hidden in Dörtjol, a town on the Mediterranean coast heavily populated by Armenians. The consul in Adana, Eugen Buege, gives a detailed account based on the report of the Armenian auxiliary official, Simon Agabalian, concerning which Buege believes “that altogether the matter has been described accurately”. Agabalian:
German diplomats were only able to report from hearsay on Van, the quasi-official trigger for the Armenian genocide, because there was no German consulate in Van. The news from German and Swiss members of relief organisations who were stationed there is only to be found in a very fragmentary manner in the files of the German Foreign Office. Thus, Turkish accounts predominate in the German diplomatic correspondence.
Due to a report from Erzerum also based on official Turkish statements, Wangenheim reports to Berlin:
Deportations in great numbers and obviously according to a central plan began in May 1915. In the beginning, apart from the intellectuals in the capital city of Constantinople and the supposedly insurgent people in Zeitun and towns along the Mediterranean coast, they mainly befell the Armenians in the east near the Russian front. From the very beginning, acts of annihilation were carried out alongside the deportations, such as in the plains of Mush, the Erzerum plateau, in the town of Trebizond and in the area surrounding Erzindjan. Furthermore, a Vali (Reschid Bey) in Vilayet Diarbekir, called “ ;bloodhound” by the German diplomats, carried out acts of extermination against the Armenians in a war of annihilation against Christians of all denominations. Insofar as the deported reached their area of destination at all, these were to be found south of Aleppo, but especially along the river Euphrates in the Syrian desert. Apart from the deportation and annihilation of the Armenians, conversions to Islam were carried out by force or under great pressure. Despite German protests, not only the Gregorian, but also the Catholic and the Protestant Armenians were deported and annihilated.
(I) 24 April 1915
All over the world, Armenians remember the genocide of 1915/16 on 24 April. On that day in the year 1915, the Ottoman government had all Armenian intellectuals of any importance arrested and sent to the interior. Only a few of those arrested survived. In German sources, this annihilation of the Armenian elite is mentioned in only a few documents.
On 30 April 1915, Ambassador Hans Baron von Wangenheim reported on the arrest of the Armenian elite:
The measures were thereby so implemented that in the main city and in the centres inland, the leaders of the population, intellectuals, notabilities and church dignitaries were thrown into prison overnight and without interrogation and court proceedings either shot or deported. [1915-11-10-DE-011]
The German journalist, von Tyszka, reports from Constantinople on the fate of the Armenian elite:
Both the period when the deportation of the Armenians in great numbers began as well as the forms it took varied from region to region. The first to be deported after the Armenians from Zeitun were the Armenians from the provinces close to the Russian border and those on the coast of the eastern Mediterranean which was controlled by the Entente fleet. In detail, Erzerum and its surroundings, the plains of Mush (on which over one hundred purely Armenians villages were to be found) as well as the area around Bitlis were affected; furthermore, the coastal strip on the Black Sea, especially Trebizond. But very soon the deportations were expanded to those regions which were not situated near the front, until finally the Armenians from all regions were deported or threatened with deportation. Local conditions were a further factor for the regional expansion of the deportations, on the one hand due to the presence of Turkish agitators, and on the other hand Ottoman officials who opposed the deportations or at least wished that they be carried out more humanely.
Erzerum was the largest town close to the Russian border, where the organisers of the genocide as well as Turkish military and police chiefs in favour of deportation were staying. German reports well verify the deportations in the north-east, because Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, the Vice-Consul and administrator in Erzerum (Anders, the German consul, had been taken a prisoner of war by the Russians), was an attentive observer.
Scheubner-Richter reporting on the countryside around Erzerum:
Only the sick were excepted; later an exception was granted for widows, orphans, old people and children under the age of five years, also for the sick and for Catholic Armenians. According to the latest reports, however, most of the exceptions were revoked once again and only children and those who were not transportable, remained behind, the latter were brought into hospitals. [1915-07-07-DE-001]
In violation of the strict rules of observation for professional diplomats, the elected Vice-Consul, Kuckhoff, also reported from Samsun in June:
Roessler reported the following on the city of Aintab:
Consul Roessler:
It was a different matter in the case of the important harbour town of Smyrna . Here, the intervention of a German general definitely saved the Armenians from being deported.
Chargé d’Affaires Radowitz sent a telegram to Berlin in November 1916:
In case of new deportations, Kuehlmann, the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Office, instructed the ambassador in Constantinople,
An unknown number of Armenians remained in their home towns or in towns that were mainly in Anatolia. Armenian women were incorporated in harems, children in families or orphanages, boys and men were hidden. It also seems that village communities received permission to stay under certain conditions. It was a precondition for all of these people that they convert to Islam. A conversion to Islam which was generally carried out by force destroyed the identity of those Armenians who survived outside the cities of Constantinople and – in the beginning – Smyrna, an identity which mainly included the Gregorian, sometimes also the Catholic or Protestant faith.
Vice-Consul Kuckhoff reports from Samsun:
To give a rough idea, the deportation trains travelled to collection points in the south of the country, especially to Aleppo and the surrounding area. There they separated in two directions: one went south to Palastina, the other east along the river Euphrates to the Mesopotamian desert, towards Mossul. The Turkish administration headquarters for the deportations was also in Aleppo.
As found throughout the entire implementation of the Armenian genocide, there were also extremely varied processes here: they ranged from the annihilation of entire deportation trains to – relatively – well-ordered deportations, although this applied to only a few trains and also usually only to certain stretches. Many reports give a general impression of what happened on the Anatolian roads.
Most of those deported were sent via certain routes. One of the deportation routes was from Trebizond and Erzerum via Erzindjan to the south, whereby there was a difference – in some cases a great difference – between the trains from the two towns.
Ambassador Wangeheim on the deportations from Trebizond:
An Austrian personally witnessed the passing of a train of deported people near Urfa:
In order to eliminate resistance to the deportations, those responsible for the genocide had isolated the Armenian soldiers from their fellow countrymen. Already in March 1915, the Armenian soldiers were not permitted to bear arms in military service. Wangenheim reports that
Separating men and women was a measure constantly used to weaken the deportees. Vice-Consul Holstein reports from Mossul:
After the extensive annihilation of the Armenian men right at the beginning of the deportations, the women and girls were left defenceless. Consul Roessler appeals to his embassy:
The German missionary, Blank, reports on the orders of an officer:
The German engineer, Bastendorff, reports on the fate of Armenian women in Ras ul Ain:
According to the German reports, the Armenians were partly or totally annihilated in several residential locations.
Mordtmann, the German consul general responsible for reporting on the Armenians in Turkey, noted after a discussion with the Swedish nun, Alma Johansson, who worked for the “German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient“ , on the events in Mush during the middle of June 1915:
Two dying women lay near a grave. Around them stand gravediggers and street urchins, waiting for the moment of death to lay them in the grave. In answer to my question, how these women got to the cemetery, I was told: There were five bodies brought on an oxen cart, placed one on top of the other without a coffin. When the gravedigger wanted to carry out his duties he noticed that of the five bodies three were still alive. A boy whose death did not seem to be imminent was taken away from the cemetery, while the two women were kept there. [1915-09-27-DE-014]
Roessler reports on a journey he made:
The German Christians’ special interest in the Armenians lay in their brothers in faith, the Protestants and the Catholics. Even the German diplomats attempted to achieve exceptional measures for them, often under special pressure from denominational groups in Germany. Although the Germans were assured that the Catholic and Protestant Armenians would be excepted from deportations, these promises were not kept. Consul Roessler reports:
that the Catholic and Protestant Armenians, who had by and large not been involved in any revolutionary movements, would be allowed to return to their homes as far as possible. [1915-12-18-DE-001]
Vice-Consul Hoffmann then reports from Aleppo:
According to German reports, there were several collection points for the deported Armenians. In October 1915, Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports from Alexandrette on some of them after he represented Roessler in Aleppo, thereby getting a good idea of the situation, because according to Hoffmann,
thanks to its central position, Aleppo is still the focal point of the deportation of the Armenians and, therefore, a particularly suitable location for gaining an overall picture of the occurrences.
The nearest destination up to now for the deportees arriving from the north and north-east were the stations Tell-Abiad, Rass-el-Ain and (for Aintab and Marasch) Aktsche-Koejuenli on the Baghdad Railway, then Aleppo . According to reports by the government, at the end of October about 20000 people were accommodated in Aleppo; only a few of them were in individual homes (at their own expense), the largest part in caravansaries (”khans”) or in open field camps on the outskirts of the town. The convoys arriving from Central, North and West Anatolia are streaming into the collection camp near Ma’mureh (alongside the Baghdad Railway in the Vilayet Adana) and on to the one in Katma (48 kms to the north-west of Aleppo by the Baghdad Railway). By the end of October, according to official government reports, about 40000 deportees had collected there.
There had obviously been attempts during the first weeks of deportation to settle the Armenians in Muslim villages, even if they were scattered. Thus, Roessler reports from Aleppo:
The streams of refugees divided beyond Aleppo and east of the provincial capital. While a smaller part of the deported Armenians was driven on in the direction of Palastina, those responsible for the genocide directed the larger part along the Euphrates river (first through Aleppo, later by-passing Aleppo via Bab and Meskene) to Deir-es-Zor and also further in the direction of Baghdad as well as Mossul, furthermore via Tell Abiad and Ras ul Ain to Mossul. Vice-Consul Hoffmann describes the routes:
Consul Loytved-Hardegg reports from Damascus:
The Chabur river, which flows into the Euphrates south-east of Deir-es-Zor, was indeed to become one of the most gruesome places of death for the deported Armenians who had survived until that time. But it was not the only gruesome place.
Another place was Tell Ermen ; as early as July 1915, Ambassador Wangenheim reports on its fate:
Even in the relatively closed off Ottoman Empire, it was hardly possible to openly propagate the genocide of Christian minorities, in particular the Armenians, as a political goal. Thus, the government had to give both its own people and its allies real or supposed reasons which seemed to justify the strict measures taken against the Armenians. And the Armenians’ obvious defences had to be reinterpreted as revolts in order to give proof later for the Armenians’ supposedly traiterous attitude.
The Turkish accusations concerning treason followed two lines of argumentation: on the one hand, the Armenians had shown sympathy for the enemy Entente; on the other hand they had planned and carried out a conspiracy against the state. The Young Turk regime attempted to establish a causality between the two lines.
(1) Sympathy for the Entente
The majority of the Armenians – and the German diplomats were also of this opinion – had much more sympathy for the countries which made up the Entente (England, France and Russia), i.e. the war-time enemies of Turkey and Germany, than for the authoritarian regimes with which Turkey was allied. There were a number of historical reasons for this, but especially, of course, the fact that England and France symbolised a democracy which was very popular with the Armenians, but which the Germans despised. There is a reference in the files which is almost amusing.
In a long report, Ambassador Wolff-Metternich describes how the Armenian Great National Council functions and remarks on its constitution:
Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter speaks in a report of the
Zimmermann’s statements showed the direction in which the Young Turks, but also Germany in its official position, attempted to justify the deportations: Turkish Armenians had hatched plans for revolt, acquired weapons, cut telegraph wires and sided with the enemy – in short: they had betrayed their native country and risen against the Ottoman Empire. Soon there was no longer talk of rebellious Armenians, but of the entire Armenian people having risen against the Turks. But what is most conspicuous is that these accusations of treason were made almost solely by official Turkish and German sides, while generally the observers on the spot reached completely different conclusions. In the beginning, German consuls were also among those giving warnings, but their statements show that they produced hardly any evidence, merely passing on Turkish accusations.
There were reports or fears of revolts even before the events in Wan. After the bombardment of Trapezunt by the Russian fleet, Consul Bergfeldt reports:
Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports from Alexandrette, known today as Iskenderun:
Whenever German observers thought of actual or supposed revolts, they always spoke only of the case in Van which they could not investigate (no doubt the success of the Turkish powers of persuasion), but they also realised that, generally, the Armenians were merely using armed clashes to try and protect themselves against their imminent annihilation. Scheubner-Richter:
Germany was the closest ally of the Ottoman Empire. Contacts which took place almost daily between German diplomats and Turkish partners led to a series of references on the real reasons why the Young Turks wanted to destroy the Armenians as a nation, and their motives. They were also aware of efforts undertaken by the Young Turk leaders to hush up the reality of a planned genocide: by means of counter-orders which were obviously only meant as a deception, as far as simply denying the genocide.
It is not clear from the German diplomatic sources when the decision concerning the Armenian genocide was made by the Turkish leaders. However, the German sources did show the change towards an ultra-nationalistic policy.
The break from the mutuality with Armenian politicians to their persecution and murder was outwardly characterised by the assignment of reforms for the Armenian provinces which had been worked out by the Great Powers, especially Russia and Germany, in the embassy discussions in Constantinople. These reforms were to give the Armenians certain autonomous rights and, thus, protection against despotic acts by the Turkish administration, as had been common in the past. Ambassador Hans Baron von Wangenheim describes the termination of the contract with Hoff and Westenenk, politicians who were intended to become general inspectors for the Armenian provinces
Possibly, the deportation and extensive annihilation of the Armenians was decided upon by the Young Turks, but it was also supported by the Turkish military – if it was not actually, at least in part, the initiator, for example in the region of Erzerum. Although it also partly justified the deportations on the basis of military necessity, it went far beyond the necessary steps as far as open propagation of the annihilation of the Armenians. Because Erzerum was one of the most important, if not the most important regional centre of genocide, the German diplomatic reports on the role of the military go back at the beginning to the Administrator and Vice-Consul Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter who, as he himself was an active officer, was able to give authentic reports on the intentions of his Turkish colleagues.
Already before 24 April, Scheubner-Richter reports from Erzerum:
The Armenians in Turkey were considered to be hard-working and rich. This stimulated the greed to enrich oneself at their expense. Although such gains are a little-known motive for the annihilation of the Armenians, they have been ascertained again and again by German observations.
An eye witness had reported to Roessler:
With little exception, public officials and police divisions are enriching themselves during the vacation of the Armenian houses in the most shameless way. [1915-08-27-DE-013]
Bergfeld speaks of the
mainly to the resistance of those local circles who would suffer great losses of money if they disappeared. [1916-01-03-DE-001]
The elimination of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire could not have been achieved solely by means of goading peoples’ greed. Those responsible for the genocide went several steps further. They not only deported and killed those they suspected of resisting the authority of the state, of causing revolts and of treason, they also went as far as jointly and severally confining an entire people for the possible crimes of individuals.
Consul Roessler complained:
An eye witness reported to Roessler:
If the statements of the German diplomats and their informants on the individual aspects of the deportations already verify that the decimation resp. annihilation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was the main goal of the Young Turks, then the key quotations, including those of the German diplomats and observers, make it clear that, in their opinion, the deportations constituted genocide.
Scheubner-Richter from Erzerum:
The whole measure seems to be aimed at a complete extermination of the Armenians. [1915-08-21-DE-011]
Lieutenant Colonel Stange on the deportation of the Armenians from Erzerum, even though it was known that the deportation routes were unsafe, resp. that killer troops waited there for the Armenians:
There are several statements on the number of deported and murdered Armenians, some of which only refer to certain sections. But they are useful for gaining an impression of the size which the observers on the spot perceived.
Consul Roessler reports:
Even today, the Armenian genocide is denied by those affected, the Turkish government, but also by scientists. This is made easier for those who deny the genocide, at least it seems to be so, by orders and counter-orders given by the Ottoman leaders, who used this method as a general attempt to hush up the crimes they ordered to be carried out. The assessment of such orders is made difficult by the fact that, at least according to German sources, one of the most important members of the triumvirate did not completely support the official standpoint which was oriented towards the annihilation of the Armenians: the Minister of Naval Affairs and Supreme Commander of the 4th Army, stationed in the south, Djemal Pascha.
Roessler reports that already before the beginning of the deportations on a large scale, Djemal Pascha had given orders
Mordtmann, the Armenian expert, notes after a discussion with Talaat:
Who was the driving force behind the Armenian genocide? The German diplomatic sources seldom go into this directly. But there are a number of references, some of them hidden, which show who the German observers considered to be the initiators of the deportations and the annihilation of the Armenians. Sometimes there is just talk of “from above”, sometimes of the “ government”, but for the most part of the Young Turk Party (“Ittihad ve Terakki”), i.e. the “Union for Unity and Progress”, or generally of the Young Turk “committees” or “clubs”.
The German observers or their informants often did not know who exactly issued the orders, when they wrote ”from above“ or “from Constantinople“. They then often indicated “the government”, although especially in the case of the observers in the provinces it was not always clear whether they actually meant the government as such or simply the leaders. Thus, the team of leaders of the Young Turks, the radical wing of the party, the triumvirate Talaat, Enver and Djemal, or only one of them are sometimes concealed behind the “government”. The decisive factor was that these were orders, instructions or directives “from above”.
Roessler reported that the Vali from Aleppo, Djelal Bey, had said to him
In many cases, however, the references to “above” definitely concern the Young Turk Party itself, the committees and the clubs. Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter reported on the “purging of the Erserum plain” by “irregulars”, as he calls them:
In the opinion of German observers, Minister of the Interior Talaat was, in fact, the person chiefly responsible for the genocide. Consul General Schmidt from Jerusalem reports that the Minister of Naval Affairs and associate in the triumvirate, Djemal, said about Talaat:
On the other hand, there were also Turkish statesmen at the top level who obviously disapproved of the Armenian genocide. One of these was the President of the Chamber, Halil Bey, who according to Ambassador Hohenlohe-Langenburg seems not to condone the government’s actions against the Armenians and
Grand Vizier Halim was also opposed to the deportations, according to evidence given by the German diplomats. Wolff-Metternich:
The Minister of Naval Affairs, Djemal Pasha, was obviously more difficult to judge. Ambassador Paul Count Wolff-Metternich about him:
The German consuls and observers knew more about those with whom they often worked together on a daily basis than about those responsible far away in Constantinople.
General Posseldt, the German commander of the fortress in Erzerum, reports:
There were several higher provincial officials who opposed the annihilation of the Armenians or at least attempted to alleviate the fate of the deportees. The most well-known among the Valis who refused to take part in the murder of the Armenians was the Governor General of Aleppo, Djelal Bey, who was relieved of his duties because of his mild policies.
Consul Roessler from Aleppo:
Vice-Consul Holstein reports from Mossul:
Those who implemented the genocide were recruited from various fields. On the one hand, the lower officials from the provincial authorities were possible executives. Furthermore, soldiers are mentioned in several reports who took part in the deportations and acts of annihilation. In principle, the gendarmes, who are mentioned in many reports as escorts, were responsible for national security. Like the soldiers, it would have been their job to escort the deportees and, thus, to protect them. But generally they merely drove the defenceless Armenians further along, often using brutal methods, and also took part directly in acts of killing, as is made evident in the German sources. The fourth decisive party were special troops, made up partly of volunteers and partly of recruited prisoners. In some reports they are called “ Djettes” (spelled in various ways) or, according to the old name used in the 19th century, “Bazibazuks”, but also “irregulars” or simply “volunteers”. In several cases, these special troops also appeared as ethnic groups: as “Ashirets”, Kurdish militia, or simply in the form of ethnic groups, Kurds especially and Circassians.
References to the complicity of lower officials are seldom, because it was often a problem to identify them, but there are references to government agencies in general in several places, although just which government agencies are meant remains open.
Consul Roessler reports on corpses “all bound together in the same way, two by two, back to back”, which floated for more than three weeks on the Euphrates river:
According to German sources, both Turkish officers and men also played a role in the implementation of both the deportations as well as the acts of annihilation. Naturally, the German diplomats are careful in matters of a military nature, because during a major war they were required to stay out of all military affairs. However, the sources also give references here to the entanglements of the Turkish military in the genocide.
Blank, the German missionary, reports on an officer who instructed his subordinates:
Generally, the deportation trains were accompanied by gendarmes. This police, responsible for national security, had once been well trained by the French, but then often had to take over other duties. The quality of the new appointments was quite miserable. Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter writes that they
Soldiers and gendarmes could, at least, be recognised because of their uniforms. Special organisations, on the other hand, acted in as secretive a manner as possible. Neither their social nor their ethnic origin were easy to recognise. Nevertheless, there are also references to them in the German sources, sometimes obliquely referred to as gangs or Tshetes. The first references came from the victims themselves. Wangenheim wrote that the Armenian side held the following groups responsible for the occurrences:
The German observers noted in several places that the liquidation of the Armenians was also condemned by many Turks. In his report on the events in Zeitun, i.e. before the quasi-official beginning of the deportations, Consul Roessler wrote that the initiators of a plan to deport all the Armenians from Zeitun and to raze the town
Chapter 6: The Role of the Germans
In the documents published by Lepsius, many of those places have often been abridged in which the role of the Germans in the genocide was described in a negative manner. Other documents in which the Germans are portrayed unfavourably were not even included in the collection of documents. Thus, a chapter on the Germans and the Armenian genocide which is based on the documents published by Lepsius has only a limited significance and must, of necessity, be incomplete. Only after the planned publication of all of the German documents on genocide by the Foreign Office can a more extensive chapter be written on this problem area.
Similar to the majority of the Young Turks, the Germans also largely met with indifference or even antipathy from the Armenians. This critical attitude towards Germany had its roots in the persecution of the Armenians from 1894 to 1896, when the German Empire sided with Sultan Abdul Hamid.
After the fighting in Zeitun, Germany’s consul in Aleppo, Walter Roessler, noticed in the northern area of his working district an
Contrary to the simple people, the Armenian clergy searched for a certain protection among their German fellow clergymen for reasons of political survival. The Consul of Erzerum at that time, Edgar Anders, reported after a visit to Etchmiadzin that the Catholicos, Kevork V, was already pleased before the war that Germany had set up a consular representation in Erzerum. Anders:
From the very beginning, the Germans attempted to hold the Armenians to a loyal attitude towards the Turkish ally. Friedrich Schuchardt, the director and deputy chairman of the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient, gives an example in a letter to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg:
Even after the deportations began and the first reports arrived on the murder of all the passengers of the deportation trains, the Germans continued their policy of support for Turkey, their ally, even though this policy was occasionally verbally limited. The argument in particular that the deportations were necessary “for military reasons” was accepted even by some of the German consuls who had pronounced themselves against the sanctions.
1) Approval of the Deportations
Ambassador Wangenheim moderated Scheubner-Richter’s request to protest to the Supreme Commander in Erzerum against the deportations:
In order to counteract the accusation that they were interfering in Turkish politics, Ambassador Wangenheim recommended that his consuls exercise extreme restraint in case of possible protests. Because the first deportations reported to the German embassy in Constantinople took place in Erzerum and the surrounding area, this attitude of Wangenheim’s was most clear in his correspondence with Scheubner-Richter, the vice-consul there. In a directive to Scheubner-Richter, Wangenheim instructed him as follows:
The German consuls reported explicitly and very exactly on the events in their administrative districts to their embassies resp. the head office in Berlin, as has been verified often in the previous chapters. Sometimes their desperation can be felt: that, although their superiors were well informed on the genocide, they were obviously not prepared or in a position to draw the right conclusions. The sentence placed in brackets by Vice-Consul Hoffmann from Alexandrette is an example of the German consuls’ hidden criticism of their superiors:
Even before 24 April, Ambassador Wangenheim qualified:
Scheubner-Richter, the man at the front, later doubted in a memo to the Foreign Office whether such restraint had paid off:
It was soon very obvious to the diplomats and the politicians that the Armenian genocide would not be accepted by the rest of the world and impair not only Turkey’s future, but also Germany’s. Thus, their efforts were then increasingly directed towards calculating the negative consequences of the genocide and absorbing them by diplomatic and propagandist means.
In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, German investments in Turkey had risen considerably. The Greeks and the Armenians were the Germans’ most important trading partners in the Ottoman Empire for they controlled trade. But even in general, the Germans feared economic disadvantages from the actions taken against the Armenians. Consul Buege reports from Adana:
Although the press was strictly censored in Germany, it was particularly through the publications by Johannes Lepsius and the Director of the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient, Friedrich Schuchardt, generally in church bulletins and missionary writings, that part of the German public was, in fact, informed of the progress of the Armenian genocide. This resulted in protests from ecclesiastical circles, to which politicians and diplomats reacted: by preventing the flow of information or by pacification.
In connection with the transportation of a letter from the German missionary, Karl Blank, to Schuchardt, Wangenheim notes that it seems to be necessary
The diplomats had to take the international public far more seriously into account than the Germans when they would be preparing the peace treaty after the end of the war. They knew that the close alliance with Turkey alone meant that the German Reich also had a share of the responsibility for the genocide.
Even very early on it was clear to Ambassador Wangenheim
A possible share on Germany’s part of the responsibility for the genocide which went beyond the toleration of measures motivated by military considerations or not founded at all was one of the aspects which were to be suppressed in the documents published by Lepsius. This, of course, was not completely achieved.
The consuls and informants learned from very different sources and reported on the fact that not only the Armenians, but also the Turks assumed that the Germans had been involved in the Armenian genocide. Consul Roessler reports from Aleppo:
While those Germans responsible greatly restrained themselves in their official diplomatic moves against the genocide, they noticeably intensified their protests against claims of a German joint responsibility. Undersecretary of State Zimmermann sent a telegram to Wangenheim:
Germany’s most important economic project in the Ottoman Empire was the Baghdad railway which, at the outbreak of the war, had been completed as far as Nusaybin, today a town on the border to Syria, but which was not able to run the entire distance, because important parts through the mountains were missing which had to be connected by tunnels. But many Armenians settled along a part of the Baghdad railway line, especially in Kilikien, and these people also made up an important part of the staff of this prestigious German project. Early on, the Catholicos of all the Armenians had recommended these Armenians to the care of the Germans. After a visit to Etchmiadzin, the German consul in Erzerum at that time reported that Kevork V. had said to him:
The Armenian employees of the Baghdad Railway are also only mentioned in passing in the Lepsius documents, and only in a very fragmentary way. With regard to his administrative district, eastern Kilikien, Vice-Consul Hoffmann writes:
Undersecretary of State Zimmermann’s notes for the 86th session of the Budget Committee of the Reich on 29 September 1916 are about the only document in the files selected by Lepsius which justifies the German point of view on the Armenian genocide:
No aspect has been so rigorously deleted in the files published by Lepsius as the one concerning the participation of German officers in actions against the Armenians. In any case, military matters only played a minor role in those Foreign Office files which were concerned with the genocide. Thus, even in the adjusted version of the published files there are only a few indications on the role of German officers in the genocide.
Roessler, the consul in Aleppo, reports that in Zeitun the Turkish authorities acted harshly against Armenian deserters, possibly at the order of the Germans.