Chapter 3: Pretexts for the Genocide and Defences

Even in the relatively closed off Ottoman Empire, it was hardly possible to openly propagate the genocide of Christian minorities, in particular the Armenians, as a political goal. Thus, the government had to give both its own people and its allies real or supposed reasons which seemed to justify the strict measures taken against the Armenians. And the Armenians’ obvious defences had to be reinterpreted as revolts in order to give proof later for the Armenians’ supposedly traiterous attitude.

(I) The Pretexts

The Turkish accusations concerning treason followed two lines of argumentation: on the one hand, the Armenians had shown sympathy for the enemy Entente; on the other hand they had planned and carried out a conspiracy against the state. The Young Turk regime attempted to establish a causality between the two lines.

(1) Sympathy for the Entente

The majority of the Armenians – and the German diplomats were also of this opinion – had much more sympathy for the countries which made up the Entente (England, France and Russia), i.e. the war-time enemies of Turkey and Germany, than for the authoritarian regimes with which Turkey was allied. There were a number of historical reasons for this, but especially, of course, the fact that England and France symbolised a democracy which was very popular with the Armenians, but which the Germans despised. There is a reference in the files which is almost amusing.

In a long report, Ambassador Wolff-Metternich describes how the Armenian Great National Council functions and remarks on its constitution:

This constitution was in accordance with the ultra-democratic spirit which had always reigned among the Gregorian Armenians. [1916-08-23-DE-001]

In accordance with the situation in the empire at that time, the title ” ultra-democratic“ was meant in an extremely critical way. The Germans compared this characteristic trait of the Gregorian Armenians with the laudable features of those Armenians whom they had converted to Protestantism and Catholicism and who were very obedient to authority, as is right and proper. For this reason Wolff-Metternich also established in the following passages:

It is an open question as to just how true the statement is that the Armenian subversive parties were raised by the community’s democratic constitution. At any rate, the National Council and the parties worked hand-in-hand and during the past few years they attempted to spread the same democratic spirit among the Protestant and Catholic Armenians, occasionally even with the support of the Porte, and accordingly to reorganise the administration of this community. [1916-08-23-DE-001]

The source of the support of the Porte, the Ottoman government, lay in the Young Turks, who, as ardent followers of the French Revolution, once set out to introduce a democracy of a Western calibre in Turkey. Based on the French model, the Young Turks named their united party the “Union for Unity and Progress”; it was organised in “committees” in which French was often spoken. The Young Turks shared this sympathy with the majority of the Armenians. Scheubner-Richter, the German Vice-Consul in Erzerum, also ascertained a French influence, particularly in the educational system:

The surprisingly high educational standard of the Armenians both in the town and in the country, which they owe to the effects of their clergy and to their excellent schools, enables them to familiarise themselves with European culture and technology and to encourage the introduction of these in their home environment. It is important to remark that the influence of French culture on the Armenians is very strong and their sympathies are probably on the French side. The many schools, which are under the directorship of French clergymen, have had a very strong influence in this respect. [1915-08-10-DE-001]

While the Armenians continued to hold fast to their pro-French sympathies, the pro-French views of the Young Turk committee members now at war with the former ideological mother country led to some problems, and this was one of the causes for their contempt towards the German Empire , a fact which has also been determined by the German observers.

Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter speaks in a report of the

influence of these mysterious men behind the scenes of the committee, who, in addition, are also hostile towards the Germans. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

The director and deputy chairman of the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient, Friedrich Schuchardt, writes:

Among their fellow countrymen, Turkish officers staying in Germany have made no secret of their anti-German views. [1917-05-23-DE-001]

Even if the Young Turks and Francophile Armenians pursued similar political goals for a certain period, the Young Turks used the Armenians’ preference for the Entente against them during the war. Armenian partners at the discussions attempted to play this down, especially towards the Germans. The Armenian Patriarch, Zaven, spoke to the German ambassador in Constantinople, Hans Baron von Wangenheim, on the Armenians’ attitude to the Entente powers. Von Wangenheim reports:

Referring to the sympathies of Armenians for one or the other power which is at war with us, the Patriarch explained that through border traffic with Russian regions, Russian sympathies are often brought in. Each year in spring, thousands of Armenians move to Russia to work there and return in fall to the Turkish homeland with their savings; at that point they draw a parallel between the treatment they receive abroad and their situation in Turkey, but they have no real idea how their destiny would shape up should they come under Russian rule. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

According to Wangenheim’s report, Consul Buege from Adana even showed understanding for the Armenians and estimated that

if Turkey should fall into the hands of the English or French, then all these stricken Armenians would finally find peace. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Patriarch Zaven attempted to differentiate and interpret the influence of the Entente powers. Wangenheim on his discussion with him:

Pronounced sympathies exist for the U.S. even though the practice of proselytising of the English and the American missionaries often causes offence. ... If there are sympathies for France, it is mainly because of French being taught as a first foreign language; knowledge of this language is the basis for introducing French ideas and French sympathy. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Consul Roessler reported from Aleppo that Djelal Bey, the Wali from Aleppo, had informed him

on the Turkish side of the border to Russia some of the Armenian villages occupied by Russians showed sympathy towards Russia. [1915-04-12-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter judged such sympathy less dramatically when he writes that the Turkish Armenians have always regarded Russia as “their natural protector”. In addition, Russia had

always claimed for herself this right to protection and took advantage of it. The fact that Russian Armenians, besides their enjoying greater security of life, also enjoy better living standards, is also a strong attraction for the great masses. However, on the other hand, it should be taken into consideration that stronger Russian influence would have resulted in a danger of denationalisation, limited only to the spiritual leaders of the Armenians. There are two different currents among those leaders: one of them places a high premium upon the need to safeguard the national identity that is deemed possible only in Turkey; and the other emphasises economical interests and the maintenance of religious ties with the Russians. [1915-05-15-DE-012]

Consul Bergfeld reports from Trapezunt:

The Christians ... made no secret of their aversion to Turkey and their sympathies for the Entente, in particular for Russia. [1915-07-09-DE-002]

Naturally, sympathies do not yet mean secession. The German journalist, von Tyszka:

What could the common interest be for the Armenians to break away from Turkey? They have no connection to their kingdom, like the Bulgarians, the Greeks or the Serbs, and they see too clearly to trust the Russians. [1915-10-01-DE-001]

These matter-of-fact assessments on the part of the German diplomats and observers are in contrast to the explanations given by the head of the German Foreign Office – although admittedly these are meant more for public use – to the parliamentary committee in which only money and espionage were accepted as motives by German policitians, although this was by no means untypical for that time. At the 86^th session of the Imperial Budget Committee on 29 September 1916, Undersecretary of State Zimmermann argued before the German parliamentarians:

Of course, since the establishment of the new regime, the Armenians had been strongly influenced by London, Paris and in particular by Russia. The Russian Armenians were the actual connecting link with the Turkish Armenians. Attempts had been made at making the Turkish Armenians disloyal by means of money, spying and other methods. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

(2) Accusation of Treason against the Armenians

Zimmermann’s statements showed the direction in which the Young Turks, but also Germany in its official position, attempted to justify the deportations: Turkish Armenians had hatched plans for revolt, acquired weapons, cut telegraph wires and sided with the enemy – in short: they had betrayed their native country and risen against the Ottoman Empire. Soon there was no longer talk of rebellious Armenians, but of the entire Armenian people having risen against the Turks. But what is most conspicuous is that these accusations of treason were made almost solely by official Turkish and German sides, while generally the observers on the spot reached completely different conclusions. In the beginning, German consuls were also among those giving warnings, but their statements show that they produced hardly any evidence, merely passing on Turkish accusations.

There were reports or fears of revolts even before the events in Wan. After the bombardment of Trapezunt by the Russian fleet, Consul Bergfeldt reports:

The purpose of the bombardment is not quite clear. I assume that the Russians had hoped the Armenian and Greek population would revolt, in which case they had planned a landing. [1914-11-18-DE-001]

Without basing this on the reports of his consuls, Ambassador Wangenheim reports to Berlin:

It is a matter of fact that Turkish officers do not see eye to eye with the Armenians and reproach them with being friendly to Russia and helping Russian troops to get into Turkish territory. [1914-12-30-DE-001]

In his next report on revolts Wangenheim openly names his sources:

I have met with the opinion among the Turks – and the Armenians’ attitude up to the present has not refuted this – that, should Turkey be defeated, the Armenian population would definitely side with the winner. [1915-02-02-DE-001]

Some months later and obviously based only on Turkish sources, Wangenheim again reports that the Armenians were

accused of sympathising with the Empire’s enemies, of maintaining highly treasonable relations with them and openly revolting against the authorities of the country in individual places. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

Furthermore, according to Ambassador Wangenheim, it was being said

that the Russian section of the Daschnakzutiun Party is demanding the destruction of the Muslim population in those areas which are to be relinquished by Turkey, in case the war ends unfavourably for that country. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

Scheubner-Richter reports from Erzerum, clearly stating his sources, that the Wali believes

that he has evidence for a conspiracy among a part of the local Armenians. [1915-05-04-DE-011]

Wangenheim reports, although not on the basis of German, but obviously Turkish or party statements, that

there are increasingly more signs that this movement is more widespread than was presumed up to now and that it is being encouraged from abroad with the help of the Armenian revolution committee. ... It cannot be denied that the Armenian movement has taken on a worrying character over the past few weeks, which has given the government cause to introduce severe repressive measures. [1915-05-08-DE-001]

Only in one report does Scheubner-Richter speak of an accumulation of weapons which could have been used in a revolt:

In many spots weapons had been assembled for some time now – in the earlier stages for the purpose of self-defence only against an eventual massacre, but later also for the purpose of an armed uprising. [1915-05-15-DE-012]

Two reports from the embassy in Constantinople confirm that the reports on imminent revolts and acts of treason by the Armenians definitely come from the Turkish side. Consul General Mordtmann, responsible for Armenian affairs at the German embassy, noted after a discussion with the Minister of the Interior, Talaat:

Today I suggested to Talaat Bey that the deportation measures against the Armenians in Erzerum be moderated, especially against women and children. He objected, saying that not only had incriminating correspondence just been found among the Armenians in Erzerum, but also weapons, bombs and similar items. There had been a plan to begin a revolt when the Russians advanced and to attack the Turks from the rear. [1915-05-29-DE-011]

Enver, the Minister of War, made the same accusations to Wangenheim, who reported to the German Foreign Office:

In order to curb Armenian espionage and to prevent new Armenian mass uprisings, Enver Pasha, by putting the state of war (or emergency) forward as a pretext, intends ... to resettle in Mesopotamia all those families from the recently insurgent Armenian centres who are considered to be not quite unobjectionable. [1915-05-31-DE-001]

Official Turkish sources obviously spread this version throughout the country. Germany’s representative, Kuckhoff, an elected vice-consul who mastered the rules of his trade only in a very unsatisfactory manner, reports from Samsun without having made any observations at all in his administrative district, i.e. purely from hearsay:

It is a fact that a great Armenian conspiracy was excellently organised in the whole of Anatolia and was in constant contact with foreign countries. In all towns the conspirators were well equipped with weapons, ammunition and bombs. Many of these were discovered by the authorities, but most of them must still be hidden. The government, therefore, has every reason to put an end to this dangerous revolutionary activity. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Wangenheim then tones down his consul’s report and concludes from it, that

on the one hand, the report confirms again that an Armenian conspiracy did in fact exist, but that, however, on the other hand, the rigorous measures of the Turkish government cannot be regarded as justified. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Just how far the phantasies of the Turkish informers went and the willingness of the Germans to take them seriously – or their being accomplices – is demonstrated by the German naval attaché, Hans Humann, who reports after a conversation with his close friend, Enver:

Moreover, Enver is also aware of a conspiracy, whereby about 30000 Armenians in the area around Adabazar-Ismid wanted to support a Russian landing at Sakaria. [1915-08-06-DE-012]

Only once does a German officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stange, report on cases of espionage which, however, he himself had not experienced either:

With Russian support there had been revolts and acts of violence against the Muslim population, e.g. by Lake Wan, in Bitlis, in Musch. Occasionally telegraph wires had been cut and there were not just a few cases of espionage. [1915-08-23-DE-013]

Ambassador Paul Count Wolff-Metternich reports for the first time at the end of 1915 that the Turkish government definitely intends to “punish” all the Armenians, i.e. to deport and annihilate them, and not just the truly or supposedly guilty. He also quotes his source, the Grand Vizier, who told him:

Entire districts had been organised for an uprising and supplied with weapons. It was not about the uprising of individuals, but of entire areas, which is the reason why, not just individuals could be singled out for punishment. [1915-12-09-DE-001]

Wolff-Metternich repeats statements made by the Minister of the Interior, Talaat Pascha, which had the same drift:

In the districts on the Russian border and near Aleppo mass displacements had been necessary on the grounds of military security. A Russian-engineered large-scale conspiracy among the Gregorian Armenians in the border areas and near Aleppo has been discovered. Attacks on bridges and railways had been planned. [1915-12-18-DE-001]

Consul Roessler reports that the Mutessarif of Marash said to a German nun:

Armenians were apprehended who passed themselves off as Syrians and who were in possession of new British weapons. Their interrogation by the Mutessariff himself resulted in the following: they belong to a secret association which has connections with the Russians and the British. They gave many names, including a street and a house number in Aleppo where supposedly there was a cache of weapons, which was then actually found. [1916-05-12-DE-011]

Dazu erklärt Rößler, in Aleppo

the weapons of soldiers who had deserted were traded for business purposes, whereby Muslims and Jews were also involved. [1916-05-12-DE-011]

Not surprisingly, at the 86^th session of the Imperial Budget Committee on 29 September 1916, the highest representative of the German Foreign Office, Arthur Zimmermann, repeats the quasi-official version:

The revolution against the Turks was keenly preached by those Armenians who were living in neutral and hostile foreign countries. The result was revolts. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

Finally, it was again one of the Young Turk statesmen, Djemal Pascha, who affirmed in a conversation with representatives of German Christians in Berlin that with regard to the Armenians,

this was not a religious, but a political matter. Turkey could be compared to a man who is assaulted from all sides and must resort to the most drastic measures in this life-threatening situation. Furthermore, in every country, especially in times of agitation, the population easily went beyond the government’s severe measures and allowed itself to be carried away into rioting which could not be approved of. In Turkey, this was the case in particular with the Kurds. The Turkish government did not take action against the Armenians because they were Christians, but because they were Armenians and the continued existence of the nation was endangered. [1917-09-06-DE-001]

None of these Turkish-German statements on an Armenian endangering of the Ottoman nation is confirmed by the German observers on the spot. Their statements are clear: In each administrative district of the German consuls there was no Armenian revolt against the Ottoman Empire worthy of the name. If there was talk of revolt, or more especially of one revolt, it was of the one in Van which no German diplomat had observed himself and, thus, could testify to, because there was no consul there. And this also held for Bitlis and Musch, which are cited in some documents as towns of revolt. The observers’ statements are based on general assessments due to their intimate knowledge and go as far as detailed investigations, insofar as local accusations are concerned.

Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports from Alexandrette, known today as Iskenderun:

As far as I know about the character and doings of the small local population, I do not believe that they would commit treason. [1915-03-07-DE-011]

On the basis of the reports by his consuls, Ambassador Wangenheim writes:

Each side is revoking the accusations of the other party as unfounded, or the blame for such events is being put on the others. There only seems to be agreement on one point: that the Armenians have given up their ideas of a revolution since the introduction of the Constitution and that there is no organisation for such a revolt. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

Johann Mordtmann, who was responsible for the Armenian matters, gives a report on a discussion with General Posseldt, who is stationed in Erzerum and who

believes that the Armenians would remain calm if they were not suppressed by the Turks and provoked by them. It is often a matter of envy of competitors. The behaviour of the Armenians is said to have been excellent. [1915-04-26-DE-011]

Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter reports from Erzerum on the deportations:

These measures cannot be explained for military reasons, because the revolt of local Armenians is not expected. [1915-06-02-DE-012]

The head of the orphanage, Johannes Ehmann, reports from Kharput (in the absence of a German consul) on the situation and determines that

by far the majority of the population in this Vilayet is obedient to the government and the Christians here are not even remotely considering rebelling against the government. [1915-05-05-DE-011]

According to Ehmann, the Wali of Mamuret ul Aziz was

convinced of the peace-loving character of the local Christian population who are loyal to the government. But there is a danger that strong elements who are enemies of the Armenians will get the upper hand and move on to the worst. [1915-05-05-DE-011]

In a further letter Scheubner-Richter notes

that a rebellion on the part of the Armenians in Erserum and its surroundings is not expected despite the negligible numbers of Turkish military forces in existence here. The Armenians living in areas near to the Russian border have long ago left their homelands; some of them fled to Russia where they are said to have joined the Russian troops – as was the case in Van – to fight against the Turks. Some of them came to Erserum. Isolated incidents, such as armed resistance in the case of requisitions in far away villages, the killing of Turks who wanted Armenian girls and women handed over to them, or the cutting and sabotaging of telegraph and telephone lines, and espionage are not unusual phenomena during a war in border areas containing mixed populations. [1915-05-15-DE-012]

In the same report Scheubner-Richter writes:

As far as I know, the house searches have not yielded any incriminating material. [1915-05-15-DE-012]

And one day later the Vice-Consul gives his impression from Erzerum:

A revolt by the local Armenians is not to be expected; thus, this measure of cruel deportation is unfounded and provokes rage. [1915-05-16-DE-011]

Three months later, Scheubner-Richter writes that in his administrative district

neither weapons nor compromising documents were found. If a rebellion had been planned here, then the most advantageous moment for such an event would have been in January, when the Russians were stationed 35 km from Erserum and Erserum's garrison held only a few hundred gendarmes, while in Erserum's labour battalions alone there were 3 - 4000 Armenians. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

Lieutenant Colonel Stange, stationed in Erzerum, backs him up.

The Armenian population in Erserum had remained completely calm until this point. Whether they would have remained so quiet if the Russians had advanced and come close to Erserum, for example, cannot be determined for certain at present. Except for a relatively small fraction, all Armenians who were fit for military service had been called up. In view of this, there seemed to be no particular reason to fear any effective uprising. [1915-08-23-DE-013]

Discoveries of bombs are also used again and again as proof of Armenian conspiracies. Scheubner-Richter passes on a report which does not, however, come from his administrative district:

Bombs and decoding manuals were supposedly found in Kaisarie during house-to-house searches. These movements are put down to provocative agitation by enemy powers. [1915-03-03-DE-011]

Wangenheim also refers to Turkish sources which report from Van:

The Armenians also operated with bombs and, consequently, the Dette Publique building and the post office were destroyed. [1915-04-24-DE-002]

After a conversation with the Armenian Patriarch, Mordtmann made a note concerning the discovery of bombs, that in Everek, near Kaisarie,

there was an explosion in the house of an Armenian who had immigrated from the United States. The neighbours who came hurrying by found the man, who had been severely wounded by an exploding grenade. He was able to indicate that there were three other, similar bombs in the house which they then hid at his orders. The police got wind of the matter; besides these three bombs they found 24 other, not yet loaded bombs under the tiled roof of the Armenian church, furthermore, some 62 rifles in Everek and the surrounding area. [1915-04-26-DE-014]

Based on Turkish sources, Wangenheim reports:

Larger stocks of bombs were discovered in Diarbekir and Kaissarie. [1915-05-06-DE-002]

And two days later:

the Minister of the Interior recently quoted the number of bombs found in Kaissarie as being 400; also some had been found in Diarbekir and sent to Van to be used there by the rebels. [1915-05-08-DE-001]

At the end of May, Wangenheim reports to Berlin:

The Minister of the Interior states that Armenians in Erzerum were heavily incriminated by discoveries of bombs and documents and that they had planned to start a revolt behind the Turkish troops when the Russians advanced. [1915-05-30-DE-011]

His consul in Erzerum was able to verify this statement and reports:

Bombs and similar objects were not discovered in Erzerum and the surrounding area, and this can also be confirmed by the Wali. [1915-06-02-DE-014]

Some Armenians had obviously also hidden bombs, but these were of little use for a revolt. In general, the discovery of weapons among the Armenians proves very little. After investigations in Constantinople, von Tyszka, the German journalist, writes:

The weapons, which the Turks found among the Armenians were mostly those which they had received from the Turks in 1908 so that they could help the Committee defend themselves against reactionaries. [1915-10-01-DE-001]

Ambassador Kuehlmann in a later report on the discovery of bombs:

The pretext for the deportations - the supposed finding of bombs and weapons at an Armenian cemetery - belongs to the already well-known inventory of such pretexts by the Turkish authorities. [1916-11-17-DE-001]

The German consuls were able to investigate accusations of conspiracy whenever such accusations referred to events that happened in their administrative districts. Roessler did so in a case where the Turks claimed there was a connection between the Armenians in Dörtyol and in Zeitun:

In the meantime I have tried to find out on what the attitude of the government to a widespread Armenian conspiracy is based. But I have only been able to discover one fact. A neutral personality who is in close contact with Armenians and well informed about them, has told me that at the beginning letters had been sent by inhabitants of Dörtyol to Zeitun declaring that the moment was favourable for an uprising. Contact had been established to the English warships. Whether the letters had met with their approval is not known to my informant. If his source was properly informed at all, this would prove an appeal to revolt. It is unknown how the addressees reacted to this request. [1915-05-27-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann, who resided in Alexandrette, was able to clear up another case:

I will depict the charges made about Alexandrette as an example. There is a passage in the detailed government report ... : ”Other Armenians have been brought by the English authorities from Cyprus to the area around Alexandrette. Amongst them were Toros, Oglu, Agop, on whom papers were found which prove without any doubt their criminal intent. These people have, amongst other things, caused trains to derail. On the other hand, the commanding officers of the English-French forces have contacted Armenians in the areas of Adana, Doertjol, Jumurtalik, Alexandrette and other coastal regions and incited them to revolt.” The core of truth that is behind this official proclamation ... is that one Armenian (Torosoglu Agop), who is said to have been set down on land near Doertjol by the English cruiser ”Doris”, was arrested there and found to be in possession of 40 allegedly English pounds. Everything else is embellishment. Neither were several Armenians involved, nor were revealing documents found on the named person, nor have Armenians caused trains to derail. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

Many of the impressions of the German diplomats and observers on the spot as well as their experience with the Turkish ally then led to their reaching a fairly unanimous conclusion in their summaries , namely, that there was very little or nothing at all to the Turkish theories on a conspiracy. Scheubner-Richter writes:

The fact that this extermination is possible, that tens of thousands of Armenians allow themselves to be slaughtered by a small number of Kurds and irregulars without defending themselves (as happened here), seems to be proof of how unwilling these people are to fight and to act as revolutionaries. The Armenians, especially the inhabitants of the cities, these "Jews of the East", are certainly cunning tradespeople, as well as shortsighted politicians, but as far as I have come to know them, most of them are not active revolutionaries. If they were, and had they had weapons, they would most certainly have violently resisted the evacuation, since they were superior in number and their death was a certainty. But this only happened in a very few places, probably where the revolutionary committees had their seat. Everywhere else the evacuation was carried out without any incidents, and later they meekly allowed themselves to be slaughtered. The timorousness of the Turkish Armenians is possibly only surpassed by the Turks' fear of them. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

The German Protestant Christians in a petition to the Imperial Chancellor:

The directives which threaten the Armenians with destruction have been justified by the Turkish Sublime Porte by the revolutionary movement within the Armenian population and strategic measures in districts along the borders. It may be the case that somewhere Armenians were justly accused of this act. But this is no justification for the deplorable course of action being carried out. [1915-11-10-DE-011]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann:

One probably arrives nearest to the truth when one admits, without attaching too much importance to the charges levelled against the Armenians, that the Turkish government recognised a welcome opportunity in the treason of the Armenians in Wan, to once and for all crush to insignificance the politically and - from the Muslim-Turkish point of view - economically equally onerous Armenian element of the population during the singularly favourable opportunity afforded by the current war. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

(II) The Defences

Whenever German observers thought of actual or supposed revolts, they always spoke only of the case in Van which they could not investigate (no doubt the success of the Turkish powers of persuasion), but they also realised that, generally, the Armenians were merely using armed clashes to try and protect themselves against their imminent annihilation. Scheubner-Richter:

According to my information a revolution or an uprisings prepared by Armenians had taken place only in Wan, in other places it was self-defence. [1915-11-09-DE-011]

Well over a year later, during a ride through eastern Anatolia as leader of a military convoy which included both German and Turkish officers as well as men, the German Vice-Consul had personally experienced how uprisings did, in fact, arise. Scheubner-Richter reports on an order

to attack and punish an Armenian village near Hesak in which supposedly rebellious Armenians had barricaded themselves. I discovered in time that the so-called “rebels” were people who had barricaded themselves for fear of being massacred and who would have gladly been prepared to give up their weapons if only they were assured of being left alive. [1916-12-04-DE-001]

Correctly recognising cause and effect, Wangenheim’s deputy and the Ambassador on Extraordinary Mission, Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, also reports on military acts by Armenians:

Since the beginning of this month the Wali of Diarbekir, Reschid Bey, has begun with the systematic extermination of the Christian population in his administrative district, making no distinction between race or creed. … As a result of this … the Christian population between Mardin and Midiat has risen up against the government and destroyed the telegraph wires. [1915-07-31-DE-001]

Roessler and Hoffmann report from their fields of work on the supposed uprisings by the Armenians. Roessler:

The Government had taken preventive measures, to a degree of severity seldom seen in history, against the Armenians and thereby evoked resistance in three places: in Fundadjak, in Suediye and in Urfa. [1915-11-08-DE-001]

There is hardly any information on Fundadyak in the documents selected by Lepsius and even these references had been deleted in the publication. The only report is that of the German nun, Paula Schaefer, who was working in Marash and reported from there:

Especially after the revolt in Fyndadyak, hundreds of badly wounded were sent to the hospital where they were treated and cared for for weeks and often months. Women and children, in particular, lay there with shot-up limbs, some of which had to be amputated; some, partly healed, are even today lying next to the hospital and waiting for our help! [1916-04-28-DE-002]

Roessler himself writes about Suediye , the defence of which animated the German author, Franz Werfel, to write his novel on Armenia, “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh”:

The fighting in Suediye (from 4 villages in the vicinity of Antiochien) ended whereby the rebels embarked onto a ship, in a hidden bay, under covering fire of an enemy warship. According to the Armenian side the number of women and children came to 6000. If one calculates with this rural population the very high percentage of 10% as being able to bear arms, then one arrives at 600 who now will possibly be called to arms in an enemy army. Despite this fact and despite the finally contrived connection to an enemy cruiser, there is no evidence whatsoever that the district had previously thought about an uprising. They were more likely driven to resistance by their imminent deportation. [1915-11-08-DE-001]

Of the three defences, the events in Urfa are best verified by German files. Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports:

14 days ago the Armenian population in Urfa received deportation orders, but decided that an immediate end was preferable to the atrocities of death during deportation and barricaded themselves. Fahri Pascha, who supposedly is in Urfa himself, has blocked off the Armenian quarter and ordered its destruction by artillery. – [In this connection a note from Mordtmann]: Yesterday, I received confirmation of the contents of this telegram from Talaat Bey who added that the Armenians had used hand grenades to defend themselves and that the battle was still going on. [1915-10-09-DE-011]

A short while later Roessler describes the course of events in Urfa in detail and comments:

For the Armenian uprising in Urfa it is also unnecessary to assume the influence of outside forces. One would like to think that outsiders arrived from Van and Diarbekr to stir up things and make themselves leaders. It is sufficient to say that the government’s preventive measures, the deportations and, therefore, the inherent decimation of their race and each individual was in the forefront of their minds and was enough for the people of Urfa to reach the decision to put up resistance. [1915-11-08-DE-001]

Roessler was particularly outraged at the report by the ”Norddeutsche Allgemeine” which printed the Turkish version of the revolt in Urfa and partly contained completely untrue statements. According to Roessler, the decisive factor in favour of the battle was that the Armenians

knew that the men would be murdered, the women and girls violated, at best put into Muslim harems, and that the rest, namely children and older women, would be abandoned to death by starvation. Thus their decision, rather to die with their weapons in their hands and sell their lives as dearly as possible than to let themselves and their families be destroyed or dishonoured. [1915-11-16-DE-001]

The “Norddeutsche Zeitung“ was the semi-official organ of the German government and reflected rather exactly the policy Germany officially took. In the documents selected by Lepsius, this policy is especially apparent in the statement of account by Zimmermann, the head of the German Foreign Office. In a memo he wrote for a discussion with the Grand Duchess of Baden at the end of September 1916, he noted:

The incident in Zeitun was not the only one. Following it, similar rioting and fighting followed in several towns in the province, which led to the beginning of the evacuation of the heavily compromised Armenian population. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

This opinion could not be substantiated by the reports from the German representatives in the province; however, it was by the reports from a bird of paradise, a resident minister who was only tolerantly smiled at by his fellow consuls in Turkey, and head of the “News Agency for the Middle East”, Baron Max von Oppenheim . He had as little knowledge of the Middle East as he had great influence in Berlin, especially with the emperor. Sometimes, however, the ambassadors in Constantinople repeated his opinion. This was the case for Wangenheim’s successor, Baron von Neurath. He had reported:

The following is from a memo placed at my disposal by Resident Minister von Oppenheim (retired), based on information from Count Wolfskehl: “Both the Armenian quarter, which is situated on a hill, as well as the individual houses, some of them very well built, had been prepared for defence in a definitely very military fashion. The main bases were the American mission (which the Armenians had taken by force), the Armenian church and school and some groups of especially solid houses. The defence was made up of about 2000 able-bodied men, well provided with rifles, including many of a small calibre, and ammunition. In addition to this they also used home-made hand grenades.” ... Apart from this battle, a larger riot already took place in Urfa some months ago, on 19 August, in which 200 Armenians and Syrian Christians were killed. [1915-11-20-DE-001]

It was Oppenheim who made three traitors out of the Armenian Torosoglu Agop, who had been branded as a traitor: Toros, Oglu and Agop. And it was he who maintained that Armenian traitors had caused trains to derail in Alexandrette, although this had, in fact, been done by a British cruiser without any assistance from the Armenians at all. "Without doubt, in the course of a temporary enemy landing which led to the destruction of the railway line from Alexandrette, espionage and other services were carried out," Oppenheimer had reported, whereupon Consul Hoffmann derisively remarked:

I have never heard this accusation, not even from the Turkish Muslim side, although the case is known to me in full detail. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann further on the baron's skills of fantasy:

How easily these kinds of events can be distorted by reference to ” unquestionable facts” is shown in the case of the machine guns of Urfa. On the grounds of a testimony which he regarded as being first-rate beyond doubt, Baron Max von Oppenheim, in my presence, treated the use of machine guns (Russian?) by the insurgent Armenians in Urfa as proven and pursued threads to Wan and Russia. Count Wolfskeel, on the other hand, who had taken part in the repression of the insurgency, dismissed the story of the machine guns as a tale belonging to a fairytale world. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

While Oppenheim drew his information from extremely dubious sources, Consul Roessler was very well informed on the events in Urfa, particularly through information he received from the Swiss deacon working in Urfa, Kuenzler, which he includes in one of his letters:

Copy of a report from Urfa by the Deacon Künzler on occurrences there since the beginning of August up to the beginning of December. Even though it is true that the report tends to repeat some facts which are already known, it is worth repeating. In particular it becomes clear from this report that between 500 and 1000 Armenians had already been slaughtered before the battles began at the beginning of October. [1916-01-03-DE-002]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann from Alexandrette gives a closing comment on the supposed conspiracies in the Mediterranean region:

Apart from the case of Wan and its adjacent zone, particular caution is called for relative to the charge of a ”militarily organised plot”. Certain local insurrectionary movements cannot be treated as proof of such. For example, the fact that the revolt in Seitun cannot be singled out as a case of a conspiracy of that kind, is clearly evinced in the reports of the Imperial Consulate in Aleppo. Also the anger of the inhabitants of Fundadschak in August and that in Urfa in October was probably, as one would put it, ” militarily organised”, but locally restricted. It did not shape up as a by-product of a planned conspiracy, but developed on the spot spontaneously due to the threat of deportation. The uprising of the Armenians in the region of Suedije (to the south of Alexandrette) was, according to the descriptions even on the part of the Turkish military, not a conspiracy but, according to a Turkish admission, a spontaneous uprising, which was due mainly to the tactlessness of the Kaymakam of Latakije in the proclamation of the order for deportation. The recovery of the revolutionaries from Suedije by French warships was also not a long-planned act. This is apparent from the circumstances and the opinions of well-informed Turks. [1916-01-03-DE-001]