Chapter 6: The Role of the Germans

In the documents published by Lepsius, many of those places have often been abridged in which the role of the Germans in the genocide was described in a negative manner. Other documents in which the Germans are portrayed unfavourably were not even included in the collection of documents. Thus, a chapter on the Germans and the Armenian genocide which is based on the documents published by Lepsius has only a limited significance and must, of necessity, be incomplete. Only after the planned publication of all of the German documents on genocide by the Foreign Office can a more extensive chapter be written on this problem area.

(I) Germany and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire

1) Antipathy of the Armenian Population towards Germany

Similar to the majority of the Young Turks, the Germans also largely met with indifference or even antipathy from the Armenians. This critical attitude towards Germany had its roots in the persecution of the Armenians from 1894 to 1896, when the German Empire sided with Sultan Abdul Hamid.

After the fighting in Zeitun, Germany’s consul in Aleppo, Walter Roessler, noticed in the northern area of his working district an

acute antipathy towards Germany shown also by most of the Armenian inhabitants of Marasch. [1914-10-16-DE-001]

The German ambassador in Constantinople, Hans Baron von Wangenheim, stated that in Adana there was also an

unfavourable mood of the Armenian population of those territories towards the German cause. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Wangenheim stated that Consul Buege also reported the same thing from Adana:

the Armenians in his district are afraid that in case of a German victory the existence of the Armenian people on Turkish ground will be annihilated, because Germany supported and even encouraged the Turkish government during the persecution of the Armenians. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Wangenheim writes that Zaven, the Armenian Patriarch from Constantinople, also commented on the anti-German sentiments among his countrymen, but toned them down:

The Patriarch avoided talking in detail about the Armenians’ unfavourable sentiments toward Germany and the underlying reason, but he meant that German politics under the rule of Abdul Hamid, which is viewed by the Armenians as hostile, was led by other considerations and that presently, due to different circumstances, there is no reason to reflect on the past and its occurrences. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Wangenheim on the Patriarch’s statements:

The above statements of the Patriarch should be taken as more or less correct and sincere. ... But it seems impossible to influence the broad masses of the Armenian population in a pro-German direction through the medium of the Patriarchate. [1914-12-29-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Hermann Hoffmann-Foelkersamb reports from Alexandrette:

The interpretation given to the Turkish actions in Dörtjol is indicative of the feeling of the Armenians against Germany. It is said that a German, who pretended to be English, visited the villages in that area and told the Armenians that they, the English, intended to occupy this area; what would the Armenian reaction be? They answered “of course”, nothing better could happen to them. The German reported this to the Turkish authorities. ... This shows once again how deeply rooted the mistrust of the Armenians against Germany is, since friendship for Turkey is automatically interpreted as enmity against the Armenians. [1915-03-07-DE-011]

Vice-Consul Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter from Erzerum writes on the relationship of the Armenians to the Germans:

German influence on the Armenians was negligible until now. Only a small fraction of educated Armenians were aware of Germany... . When the war began, the Armenian population even had doubts whether the Germans were “ Christians” since they had allied themselves with the Turks. The fact that Germany was already a friend of the absolutist regime in Turkey, under which the Armenians had suffered considerably, still fills them with distrust. The responsibility for the war is attributed also to the influence of Germany and the economic losses resulting from Germany’s influence are particularly annoying to a people which is very keen on preserving and augmenting its possessions. Furthermore remarkable is the fact – as also noted in other countries – that we have few Armenian friends among those who were educated in Germany or received their education through German missionaries. [1915-05-15-DE-012]

Undersecretary of State Zimmermann in his notes for the 86^th session of the Budget Committee of the Reich on 29 September 1916:

Shortly after Turkey had entered the war on our side, in October 1914, we already received the news from the Consul in Aleppo, ... that a considerable hatred of the Germans was apparent in the Armenians. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

2) Search for Refuge by the Armenian Clergy

Contrary to the simple people, the Armenian clergy searched for a certain protection among their German fellow clergymen for reasons of political survival. The Consul of Erzerum at that time, Edgar Anders, reported after a visit to Etchmiadzin that the Catholicos, Kevork V, was already pleased before the war that Germany had set up a consular representation in Erzerum. Anders:

He has high hopes that this measure will be greatly to the advantage of his – as he expressed it – ”poor, suppressed brothers in faith under the yoke of the Turks”. His Holiness requested that I look after the Armenians in Vilayet Erserum, insofar as my official competence permits. … He hopes that the Imperial government will continue to protect the Armenians, particularly in the area covered by the Baghdad Railway, and hopes that the extension of the railway will bring great advantages in terms of civilisation and culture to the Armenians residing there. [1913-09-26-DE-001]

Shortly before the beginning of the war Anders also reported from Mezere, the new urban centre near the provincial capital of Kharput:

The Archbishop spoke to me of his hope that a German representation would be set up in Mezere which could also watch benevolently over the fate of the Armenians. The American consul took an alien attitude towards his parish. [1914-07-10-DE-001]

After the outbreak of war and the proclaimed “Holy War” (which could only be against the Christians), the Armenian clergy searched for stronger protection with Germany. The Armenian Patriarch even asked the German Ambassador Wangenheim

to recommend that the Armenian population in the war-torn border provinces be protected by the German military and consuls stationed there. [1915-02-22-DE-001]

Wangenheim, however, already indicated another position, even though he made promises which would later not be kept by Germany. He stated to the Armenian Patriarch

that the war required great sacrifices from all parts of the population and hardships could sometimes not be avoided, particularly in the actual war-zones, but that as far as was feasible the German public authorities would look after the Armenians. I reserved the right for myself to bring up one point or the other with the Sublime Porte. [1915-02-22-DE-001]

Wangenheim refused to accept the definite role of mediator for, so he argued:

an attempt at complying with this appeal and taking on the role that England after the Berlin Congress, and most recently Russia, have played as protector of the Armenians, would be regarded by the Porte as an unjustified and annoying intervention in their internal political affairs. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

Anders’ successor in Erzerum, the administrator Erwin Max von Scheubner-Richter, on the other hand, saw a long-lasting gain for Germany, including an economical one, from taking influence in favour of the Armenians:

Furthermore, I believe that if our influence in Turkey succeeds in protecting the Armenian people from being destroyed, we will reap gratitude and valuable collaboration from the largest part of them for the development of Anatolia. ... The Armenians scattered throughout the whole of the East, thanks to their naturally inborn mercantile capabilities, would be in a position to monopolise the whole economic life and, just like the Jews, would play an often useful, but not always desirable role in it. [1915-08-10-DE-001]

3) Political Pressure on the Armenians

From the very beginning, the Germans attempted to hold the Armenians to a loyal attitude towards the Turkish ally. Friedrich Schuchardt, the director and deputy chairman of the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient, gives an example in a letter to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg:

The Wali from Maouret-ul-Aziz promised the head of our station, Preacher Ehmann, complete impunity for all the Armenians if he managed to induce the Armenians in that area to give up all the weapons in their possession. Mr. Ehmann carried out this task, but nonetheless the population there was also slaughtered or banned. [1915-12-12-DE-002]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports from Aleppo that for the Armenians

the Germans are still viewed as a complicit party because they had given the Armenian people a false sense of security. A calm-thinking Armenian clergyman (Protestant) once said to me, ”We were willing to remain loyal. Until the deportations began. If we had started at that point to resist the beginning extermination of our people, we would have been in command of the situation and not doomed to ruination as we are today. But all our German friends in Marasch, Haruniye, Urfa, Malatia and Ma’muret-ul-Aziz urgently advised us to submit ourselves and then nothing would happen to us. Believing in them, we followed that advice and the fact that we relied on the German influence proved catastrophic for us.” [1916-01-03-DE-001]

In his notes for the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, Undersecretary of State Zimmermann describes how this attempt to exercise influence was officially carried out even before the genocide began:

In December 1914 ... [we] ordered our Ambassador, ... to meet with the Armenian patriarch and to personally point out to him how important it was that Armenia took loyal sides with Turkey and fought for their common cause. From Berlin, an Armenian was finally sent by the German-Armenian Society, to Turkey who, with our support, was commissioned to negotiate with the patriarch and the leaders of the Armenian movement and to persuade them that they should stand loyally on the side of the Turks and thus procure for themselves the gratitude of the Turks and their own safety from now on. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

In further notes, which Zimmermann made for a discussion with the Grand Duchess of Baden at the end of September, he states:

With the permission of the Foreign Office, the German-Armenian Society, headed by Dr. Johannes Lepsius, at the same time delegated an Armenian intermediary to Turkey with instructions to influence the Armenian patriarch and the political leaders of the Armenians in Constantinople “in such a way that the Armenian people, in close collaboration with Turkey, should mobilise its national strength for the victory of the Ottoman weapons and in wise recognition of its own interest, should support to the best of their ability the Turkish government in the execution of all measures and war operations in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians.“ [1917-05-09-DE-001]

(II) Germany’s Position with Regard to the Deportations

Even after the deportations began and the first reports arrived on the murder of all the passengers of the deportation trains, the Germans continued their policy of support for Turkey, their ally, even though this policy was occasionally verbally limited. The argument in particular that the deportations were necessary “for military reasons” was accepted even by some of the German consuls who had pronounced themselves against the sanctions.

1) Approval of the Deportations

Ambassador Wangenheim moderated Scheubner-Richter’s request to protest to the Supreme Commander in Erzerum against the deportations:

if reversal of the measures is inopportune for military reasons, to advocate humane treatment of the deported, defenceless people. [1915-05-19-DE-015]

Wangenheim wrote to the Foreign Office that the measures taken by the Turkish government against the Armenians meant

great hardship for the Armenian population. But I am of the opinion that we should moderate the measures in their form, but not basically hinder them. [1915-05-31-DE-001]

According to Wangenheim, Johannes Lepsius and the German friends of the Armenians were to be informed, that

the measures mentioned are unavoidable in view of Turkey’s political and military position. [1915-05-31-DE-001]

Wangenheim writes that although Germany should energetically intervene against the “slaughtering of the defenceless population“, the Germans could not, however,

have [any] objection to the deportation of the Armenians, as far as this is justified by the state of war. [1915-06-21-DE-012]

Wangenheim, two weeks later:

As the repressive measures against the Armenian population of the provinces of East Anatolia, declared by the Imperial Government, were announced for military reasons and constitute a legal means of defence, the German government is far from opposing their being put into effect, as long as these measures fulfil the purpose of strengthening the internal situation in Turkey and protecting it from attempted uprisings. [1915-07-07-DE-001]

Even Consul Roessler accepted “military reasons“:

If for military reasons their deportation is unavoidable [1915-07-27-DE-001]

The German diplomats always had sympathy for the supposedly clear-cut situation with regard to the events in Van. Scheubner-Richter:

At the beginning of May, the known incidents in Wan led to the government's and the military's taking drastic disciplinary action against the Armenians. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

Even the very critical Lieutenant Colonel Stange qualifies:

The removal of the Armenians from the war zone around Erserum was legally permissible and is being justified as a military necessity. Indeed, the Armenians in various areas had proven to be unreliable. [1915-08-23-DE-013]

In a discussion with the Turkish ambassador, Undersecretary of State Zimmermann also accepts that

the earlier deportations of the Armenians could still barely be defended as being justified, taking into account the military situation at that time in the interest of national safety. [1916-09-25-DE-001]

Undersecretary of State Zimmermann notes in his justification to the German Reichstag that the circumstances

caused Turkey to take serious steps from a military point of view. Anyone will find it comprehensible that the Turks, in view of their difficult position at that time - the battles in the Dardanelles were at their apogee - then decided to evacuate the area, which was being plagued by the Armenian revolution. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

Zimmermann then defends the

severe, but militarily comprehensible measure [decided upon by the Turks] of deporting the Armenian people out of the operations and manoeuvres area. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

Several German diplomats and observers doubt, however, whether there were any “military reasons ” for the deportations at all. Even Ambassador Wangenheim admits:

It has come to light that the banishment of the Armenians is not only motivated by military considerations. [1915-06-17-DE-003]

Scheubner-Richter assesses the deportation of all the Armenians from Erzerum as being

an order that is not based on military considerations, but results, in my opinion, solely from racial hatred. [1915-06-26-DE-013]

Lieutenant Colonel Stange:

One feels justified to surmise that military considerations were of secondary import for the deportation of the Armenians and that the main aim was to take advantage of this excellent opportunity … while from the outside there was no protest to be expected. The military reasons and the rebellious efforts in various parts of the country provided welcome pretexts for this undertaking. [1915-08-23-DE-013]

2) The Principle of Non-Intervention in Turkish Politics

In order to counteract the accusation that they were interfering in Turkish politics, Ambassador Wangenheim recommended that his consuls exercise extreme restraint in case of possible protests. Because the first deportations reported to the German embassy in Constantinople took place in Erzerum and the surrounding area, this attitude of Wangenheim’s was most clear in his correspondence with Scheubner-Richter, the vice-consul there. In a directive to Scheubner-Richter, Wangenheim instructed him as follows:

Intercession on your part in favour of the Armenians will take the form of preventing excesses by the mob, such as massacres and plundering, and of encouraging proper proceedings against politically suspicious persons. In doing so it is important to avoid this appearing as if we have a right to protect the Armenians and intervene in the activities of the authorities, as well as to possibly also emphasise this in the face of the authorities. [1915-04-28-DE-012]

Wangenheim recommends that, at best, his consul in Erzerum

points out to the Vali in a friendly but insistent manner that such ignominious occurrences damage the image of the government in neutral foreign countries and with friends of Turkey. [1915-06-21-DE-012]

Scheubner-Richter’s answer:

I was aware – and this also corresponded to the instructions that were passed on to me from Your Excellency – that we do not have a right to stand up for the innocent Armenians who have been expelled, nor do we have any kind of protective rights over them. ... According to my instructions, I kept my influence within the limits of friendly advice and avoided any suspicion of this being official. After the first large massacres at Kemach, Khänus and Terdjan became public knowledge, I followed the instructions given to me by Your Excellency after receiving my report on this and lodged complaints with the Vali in a friendly, but very insistent manner. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

But Wangenheim also urged other consuls to restraint. With regard to reports on deportations from Adana he replies:

As regrettable and, in many respects, also detrimental to our interests as the persecution of the Armenian population is, however, the most recent events in the border provinces, such as the revolt in Van and other procedures in the country’s interior, do in fact justify the severe measures taken by the authorities. The Imperial Embassy is, therefore, not in a position to prevent these measures for the time being. [1915-05-18-DE-011]

3) Disapproval of the Genocide by Germans in Turkey

The German consuls reported explicitly and very exactly on the events in their administrative districts to their embassies resp. the head office in Berlin, as has been verified often in the previous chapters. Sometimes their desperation can be felt: that, although their superiors were well informed on the genocide, they were obviously not prepared or in a position to draw the right conclusions. The sentence placed in brackets by Vice-Consul Hoffmann from Alexandrette is an example of the German consuls’ hidden criticism of their superiors:

(I am of course aware that … I am telling the Imperial Embassy nothing new. I am just adding it for the sake of the completeness of my report). [1916-01-03-DE-001]

The ambassadors in Constantinople, for their part, attempted to reassure their consuls. There is also an example for this, in a telegram sent by Hohenlohe-Langenburg to Roessler:

Everything possible has been done from here and the Foreign Office has been kept up-to-date continuously. [1915-07-27-DE-011]

The consuls and their informants in part openly disapproved of the deportations as well as the annihilations and appealed to their superiors to take action against these measures. Consul Walter Roessler from Aleppo:

Enough misfortune has taken place. It is now time to stop this. [1915-05-26-DE-012]

Vice-Consul Walter Holstein from Mossul:

The Armenian massacres must be prevented at all cost. [1915-06-13-DE-011]

Vice-Consul Kuckhoff in a telegram from Samsun to Wangenheim:

I hope that Your Excellency’s experienced flexibility will succeed in putting a stop to the total destruction of the largest part of one of the oldest and unhappiest peoples on this earth. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Consul Roessler:

Would it not be possible to put a stop to any further atrocities and at least still save the Armenians from the coastal strip of the Vilayet Aleppo who are still due for deportation? ... is it not at least possible to postpone their transport by one or two months and prepare it carefully by providing the necessary pack animals and food supplies? [1915-07-27-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter from Erzerum considered it

to be my duty as a representative of the German government not to regard the actions of the government against the Armenians and the measures taken against them in silence. ... We will have to accept a moral responsibility for them, we should at least work towards the mildest possible form of implementation. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

German private individuals reacted even more impulsively to the massacres. Roessler reports:

Engineer Linsmeyer, who last month had spoken to me of the "Armenian scum", said to me literally, "I am not a man who is moved easily, but at the sight of these poor people I was not able to hold back the tears. I did not think it possible that something like this could happen in our century." [1915-07-27-DE-001]

Together with friends, the head of the Konia branch of the Anatolian Association of Industry and Commerce, Willy Seeger, wrote in a letter to the embassy:

This inhumane treatment constitutes a disgrace which is indelible in the world history not only for the Turks but also for us Germans as their current allies and advisors if we continue to stand back and allow the destruction of this people. ... We Germans, who are forced daily to observe this inhumane activity, feel it is our duty as members of a cultural state in the midst of a half-civilised people, to protest against it. [1915-08-21-DE-011]

The expert on Armenia at the embassy, Mordtmann, spoke with the Regie official, von Holbach, who had been living in Turkey for many years, and then wrote in his notes:

Mr. von Holbach closed his report with the words: He has always been completely sympathetic with the Turks; but after all he had seen with his own eyes, he had been totally ridden of his sympathies for the Turks. [1915-08-21-DE-011]

In contrast, the verbal protests of the top German diplomats in Constantinople were extremely limited.

Even before 24 April, Ambassador Wangenheim qualified:

But the present atmosphere in government circles, which is most unfavourable for the Armenians, is putting even narrower limits on the use we have for them and reminds us that particular care should be taken. Otherwise there is a danger that, through our defence of a perhaps hopeless matter, we are putting at stake more important interests which are of greater significance for us. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

Wangenheim in a memo:

The Embassy considers it a matter of urgency to give peremptory orders to the authorities of the provinces to take effective measures to safeguard the lives and the possessions of the deported Armenians, both during their transportation as well as in their new homes. [1915-07-07-DE-001]

The success of such timid interventions amounted to nothing. Wangenheim:

Unfortunately, my interventions with the Porte promise only little success. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Wangenheim in another letter:

Despite the repeated, urgent protests which we have raised the Porte continues to deport the Armenians and to abandon them to annihilation by settling them in inhospitable areas. We cannot prevent it from doing so and must leave the responsibility for the economic and political consequences of this measure to it. [1915-07-16-DE-004]

Wangenheim in an answer to Kuckhoff:

Regretfully, my repeated attempts to alleviate the fate of those deportees who have not been charged with committing a punishable offence have only very little chance of success. [1915-07-16-DE-011]

In one of his notes, Mordtmann informs that

in view of our recent experiences with the Porte ... all of the steps taken by us were unsuccessful resp. have had the opposite effect. [1915-07-21-DE-011]

Mordtmann states that upon receiving the request to exempt the Armenian employees of a German,

Talaat Bey supposedly decided, “Due to the bad example this would give, no exceptions could be made.“ [1915-07-21-DE-011]

From Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Wangenheim’s representative and the Ambassador on Extraordinary Mission, to the consulate in Aleppo:

All of the protests made by us with regard to the government’s decision to take care of the local Christians in the eastern provinces [“even up to the point of complete annihilation“ was deleted from Mordtmann’s original draft] turned out to be ineffective. Thus, for the present I must refrain from taking further steps that are particularly in favour of the Armenians. [1915-08-02-DE-011]

Hohenlohe-Langenburg does at least make a timid attempt to dissociate himself in the press from the Turks’ actions. He writes to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg:

I would like to leave it to Your Excellency’s discretion as to whether it is not recommendable to point out also in the German press at a suitable point in time that we without doubt do not approve of the enforced measures taken by the Turkish government against the Armenians and are therefore not responsible for the arising excesses to which we can only object and for which we express our regret. [1915-08-12-DE-001]

Baron von Neurath, the councillor at the embassy who was to defend German interests as chargé d’affaires after Wangenheim’s death, immediately lowered the moral standards again. Regarding a list of interventions from Mordtmann, he writes:

The points can be brought up for discussion at some time; frequent and detailed intervention would only lessen the effect. [1915-09-04-DE-001]

The reluctance of the German representatives to really support the Armenians’ cause with all their strength became apparent in the case of the two Armenians politicians, Zohrab and Vartkes. Armenian expert Mordtmann notes that upon intervention by the German embassy

it would be, in addition, an interference in pending court proceedings. [1915-07-21-DE-011]

The extreme caution of the German diplomats is also evident in a directive from Zimmermann to his ambassador that he use the supposed order of the Turkish government to protect the Armenians as a straw. The Undersecretary of State requests that his ambassador

present himself again and request in a decisive manner that the central government emphasise the instructions it issued to the provincial authorities in order to protect the Christian, but especially the Armenian population, and that it strictly control their implementation. [1915-09-22-DE-011]

Only after very urgent reports from the German consuls did Secretary of State Jagow make one more attempt to achieve results for the Armenians by protesting verbally. He wrote to his ambassador:

reports on hand give the impression that, despite all of our expostulations and warnings, the Turkish government is adhering to its disastrous policy on the Armenians. Apart from deliberations of a general humanitarian and political nature and as sincere friends of Turkey and in their very own interest, we can only deeply mourn the fact that through their incomprehensibly short-sighted actions they are robbing themselves of one of the elements of the population that are most important for the economic development of the country. ... I have the honour of requesting Your Excellency to speak to the government there in the sense given above and to take this opportunity to express once again the expectation that the Porte will follow our advice in its treatment of the Armenian question. [1915-11-29-DE-001]

The first, and only, German ambassador who seemed to be prepared to really do what he could for the Armenians was the successor of Wangenheim, who died on 25 October 1915, Paul Count Wolff-Metternich:

I have seriously discussed the Armenian atrocities during the course of the past week with Enver Pasha, with Halil Bey and today with Djemal Pasha and pointed out that wide circles both in allied foreign countries and in Germany were in the grip of unrest and indignation and that, unless these atrocities were stopped, these circles would end up withdrawing all their sympathies from the Turkish government. … I presented my case in an exceedingly sharp language. Protests are useless … Should a stop be put to this, then more severe means are necessary. I would therefore like to suggest publishing the following notice in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung , with the instruction to me that it has been commissioned by the Imperial Government: [1915-12-07-DE-001]

The text which Wolff-Metternich suggested was by no means exceptionally harsh. It was worded:

”In view of the numerous reports that have reached Germany, partly through the foreign press, about the sad fate of the Armenians of Turkey who have been evacuated from their former homes to be resettled in other areas, a growing concern is spreading among large segments of the German people. If every state should be free to decide, particularly in times of war, to proceed with all severity that is warranted under martial law against rebellious elements of its population, then every precaution should be taken in executing the orders, which are necessary for the safety of the state, to avoid an entire race, including old people, women and children, having to suffer through the fault of a few individuals.
In view of the close friendly relations ... the Imperial Government has felt obliged ... to urgently direct the attention of the Turkish government through the offices of the Imperial Embassy in Constantinople to the excesses and harshness and to repeatedly demand, both orally and in writing, that a stop be put to them immediately. The Imperial Government earnestly hopes that in the interest of both Turkey itself and the Armenian race these remonstrations will be complied with.” [1915-12-07-DE-001]

What obviously outraged Metternich the most was the Turks’ arrogance. He advised, that

our annoyance about the persecution of the Armenians should be clearly expressed in our press and an end be put to our gushings over the Turks. Whatever they are accomplishing is due to our doing; those are our officers, our cannons, our money. Without our help that inflated frog would be slowly deflated. ... In order to achieve any success in the Armenian question, we will have to inspire fear in the Turkish government regarding the consequences. If for military considerations we do not dare to confront it with a firmer stance, then we will have no choice but, with further abortive protests which tend rather to aggravate than to be of any use, to stand back and watch how our ally continues to massacre. [1915-12-07-DE-001]

Undersecretary of State Zimmermann commented his draft of the newspaper article:

It looks as though we shall have to do this. Your Excellency should, however, soften this article before publication. In its present form it would suit too well the purposes of the Entente. [1915-12-07-DE-001]

Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow also agreed:

In particular the end should sound more friendly towards the Turkish government. [1915-12-07-DE-001]

Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg opposed this vigorously:

The proposed public reprimand of an ally in the course of a war would be an act which is unprecedented in history. Our only aim is to keep Turkey on our side until the end of the war, no matter whether as a result Armenians do perish or not. [1915-12-07-DE-001]

With this, the course was mapped out for the German reaction to the genocide of 1915/16, and even Wolff-Metternich subordinated to it. Kuehlmann, the Ambassador in Extraordinary Mission in Constantinople, simply rejected further protests, because in his opinion

the frequent attempts at intervention to which humanitarian considerations in the face of these methods have driven us, were a source of continual friction with the Turkish government. [1917-02-16-DE-003]

Future protests against the Turkish allies were less intended to assist the Armenians in any way whatsoever and more to divert any harm from the Germans.

Scheubner-Richter, the man at the front, later doubted in a memo to the Foreign Office whether such restraint had paid off:

I .. won the impression that our restraint in the Armenian question caused visible damage to our reputation in Turkey and Persia, because many considered it to be a sign of weakness. More decisive action ... would be of help to our reputation, and not only the non-Mohammedans and the Arabs, but also the Old Turks and the present minority of the Young Turks would like us much more. [1916-12-04-DE-001]

(III) Germany and the Consequences of the Genocide

It was soon very obvious to the diplomats and the politicians that the Armenian genocide would not be accepted by the rest of the world and impair not only Turkey’s future, but also Germany’s. Thus, their efforts were then increasingly directed towards calculating the negative consequences of the genocide and absorbing them by diplomatic and propagandist means.

1) Germany’s Economic Interests in Turkey

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, German investments in Turkey had risen considerably. The Greeks and the Armenians were the Germans’ most important trading partners in the Ottoman Empire for they controlled trade. But even in general, the Germans feared economic disadvantages from the actions taken against the Armenians. Consul Buege reports from Adana:

With its barbaric methods, the government is obviously damaging the interests of the nation. In particular, the Deutsche Orientbank (German Orient Bank) has suffered considerable damage and has asked me to put a stop to the deportation of the Armenians. [1915-05-18-DE-011]

Ambassador Wangenheim:

Apart from the material damage incurred by the Turkish state as a result of the deportation and destruction of a hard-working and intelligent element of the population - for which the Kurds and Turks who are preliminarily taking their places do not constitute worthy substitutes -, also our trade interests and the interests of the German welfare institutions, existing in those parts of the country, are being severely damaged. [1915-07-07-DE-001]

The German embassy requests in a memo,

the Ottoman government to take into consideration the numerous interests of German trade and German welfare institutions in the provinces where they are proceeding at present with the expulsion of the Armenians. .. the sudden departure of the latter would seriously harm these interests. [1915-07-07-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Kuckhoff reports from Samsun:

They have not the least appreciation of the enormous losses suffered by the country, as well as the local and foreign business worlds as a result of the destruction of the Armenian element. The German creditors must also be badly affected. For the time being, it is not possible to stipulate final measures for their protection as it is not yet certain which of the debtors will be converting to Islam and thus staying here and which of them will disappear. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann makes suggestions in case

we for our part still plan to stem this mass murder, which from a purely economical point of view is questionable, and this would be possible. [1915-10-18-DE-012]

Consul Count Spee writes with regard to the deportation of the Armenians from Smyrna:

Materially speaking, there will be direct damage as, in fact, the Armenian merchants have been buying German goods in vast quantities, which have partly not yet been paid for. [1916-11-13-DE-001]

2) The Public in Germany:

Although the press was strictly censored in Germany, it was particularly through the publications by Johannes Lepsius and the Director of the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient, Friedrich Schuchardt, generally in church bulletins and missionary writings, that part of the German public was, in fact, informed of the progress of the Armenian genocide. This resulted in protests from ecclesiastical circles, to which politicians and diplomats reacted: by preventing the flow of information or by pacification.

In connection with the transportation of a letter from the German missionary, Karl Blank, to Schuchardt, Wangenheim notes that it seems to be necessary

to make it a condition of the handing out of Blank’s letter that the content are disclosed further either by the press or in any other way. Even under the provision that the facts contained therein are correct, there is still no cause for us to publicise them, let alone in a version which appears to be disadvantageous to the Turkish government and the Muslim population; we would only supply the enemy press with welcome material in their campaign against the Turkish government, make the position of the German welfare missions in the interior more difficult and hardly be of any use to the persecuted Armenians themselves, but only harm them. [1915-05-27-DE-001]

At any rate, the reports from the Christian missions were not without influence on the diplomats in Berlin. Rosenberg, the Legation Secretary in the Foreign Office, informed the Turkish embassy in Berlin that

a lively unrest was beginning to make itself noticed in philanthropic circles in Germany. [1915-10-01-DE-004]

Shortly before Bethmann Hollweg rejected the suggestions made by Wolff-Metternich, the German Christians had made a petition to the Imperial Chancellor in which the Protestants referred to reports from Turkey and admonished:

While up until now, all these accusations from abroad have made no impression upon the unanimously clear conscience of our people, this information, the spread of which cannot be prevented, will have the most damaging effect upon German Christians. The mere declaration of a Holy War arouses moral misgivings in many circles. We could give appeasing assurances that this Holy War is not directed against the Christians per se, but is directed, together with Christian nations, against the enemies of Turkey. No one would be capable of preventing the paralysing effects upon the joyfulness of German Christianity if they were to watch the destruction of a Christian race by one of their allies. [1915-11-10-DE-011]

Bethmann Hollweg then sent a letter to the chargé d’affaires in Constantinople, Neurath:

Enclosed is the copy of the petition which highly respected representatives of Protestant circles in Germany have brought to my attention, matters concerning the Armenian Question. The accompanying copy of the resolution of the Missionary Conference of the Central Committee of German Catholics concerns the same topic. Both announcements illustrate the growing worry and concern, also within Germany, with the proceedings being taken by the Turks against the Armenians.
Your most gracious Sir, I request, bearing in mind the formulated viewpoints and wishes presented in the documents, to continue at each and every opportunity and with all your efforts to assert your influence on the ruling powers for the benefit of the Armenians. Especially direct your attention to ensure that the measures of the Porte are not extended to include other Christian parts of the population in Turkey. [1915-11-10-DE-011]

In his answer to the Protestant Christians, Bethmann Hollweg writes:

The Imperial Government, as it has done until now, will in future always regard it as its foremost duty to exercise its influence so that Christian races are not persecuted because of their religion. German Christians may rest assured that, guided by this basic principle, I will do everything in my power to ensure that these worries and wishes conveyed to me are borne in mind. [1915-11-12-DE-012]

The comparison of the decision given to the German Christians and the harsh reply to Wolff-Metternich’s suggestion make it clear that in the eyes of the top German politicians the protests were only of a rhetorical nature. Thus, Karl Axenfeld, the Director of the Orient- and Islam-Commission of the German Protestant Mission-Board is also irritated

by the disastrous denials of what really happened on the part of German friends of the Turks who – as was recognised abroad quite rightly – thus made the Turkish government insensitive to the accusations made by the rest of the world and strengthened its resolve to carry out its Armenian policy. [1918-02-11-DE-001]

3) The People of the World

The diplomats had to take the international public far more seriously into account than the Germans when they would be preparing the peace treaty after the end of the war. They knew that the close alliance with Turkey alone meant that the German Reich also had a share of the responsibility for the genocide.

Even very early on it was clear to Ambassador Wangenheim

that our enemies will not fail to make us responsible for the injustice done to the Armenians and to stir their animosity towards us. [1915-04-15-DE-002]

The German ambassador attempted to take preventive measures against this accusation:

In order to effectively counteract any possible later invectives on the part of our enemies, as if we were jointly to blame for the rigorous Turkish actions, I have considered it my duty to point out to the Porte that we can only approve of the deportation of the Armenian people if it is carried out as a result of military considerations and serves as a security against revolts, but that in employing these measures, one should provide protection for the deportees against plundering and butchery. [1915-07-07-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Kuckhoff warned from Samsun:

It is foreseeable what consequences the Armenian question will bring about once the atrocities become known. A cry of indignation from the whole of the Christian world is inevitable. … The worst thing about it is that the whole world will put the blame on Germany as both friend and enemy believe that the power of the Sublime Porte is completely in our hands and that such an extreme measure could only have been carried out with the approval of the Germans. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

Wangenheim writes:

If I have recently reported in greater detail about these occurrences to Your Excellency, then this was done under the presumption, which is also shared by Vice Consul Kuckhoff, that our enemies will later accuse us of being accomplices. With the help of my reports, we will be in a position to prove to the hostile world at an appropriate time, in particular through the press, that we have always expressly condemned the exaggerated measures of the Turkish government and even more so the excesses of local official bodies. [1915-07-16-DE-003]

A Reuters report confirmed the Germans’ fears:

as reported by reuters the british house of lords dealt with supposedly bad situation of the armenians lord cromer said that no less than 800000 had been killed although he had no direct evidence for germany’s share of the responsibility it was without doubt responsible for this because of its great influence on turkey. [1915-10-25-DE-011]

The German Protestant Christians in their petition to the Imperial Chancellor:

The rage in neutral and enemy countries is growing on this issue and will certainly lead to passionate outbursts as soon as the full extent of the truth are made known. Will this indignation not be increasingly used with intense severity against Germany? A country seen by the world as the only country through its relationship with Turkey capable of preventing these terrible things and ensuring that the albeit necessary measures be restricted to the strategic essentials. In the same way as Germany was made responsible for Turkey’s entering the war and for the proclamation of the “Holy War”, the entire blame for the extermination of a Christian race will be attached to Germany. [1915-11-10-DE-011]

From the Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office, Bussche-Haddenhausen, to the embassy in Constantinople:

In future peace negotiations with the Western allies these will without doubt bring up the Armenian issue. [1918-03-02-DE-001]

(IV) Germany’s Joint Responsibility for the Genocide

A possible share on Germany’s part of the responsibility for the genocide which went beyond the toleration of measures motivated by military considerations or not founded at all was one of the aspects which were to be suppressed in the documents published by Lepsius. This, of course, was not completely achieved.

1) Statements on German Involvement in the Genocide

The consuls and informants learned from very different sources and reported on the fact that not only the Armenians, but also the Turks assumed that the Germans had been involved in the Armenian genocide. Consul Roessler reports from Aleppo:

It is said that Germany incited the Turkish government to take the decision to crush the Armenian people until they are completely insignificant. The Turkish government will presumably do everything to encourage this attitude. It will be pleased to shift the blame for the odium of its disciplinary actions onto us. But this will mean Germany’s name being dragged through the mud. … Just like the destruction of the Armenians is implied in this country as being a result of German incitement, the Turkish government is trying to hide its behaviour from the European public behind our authority. [1915-07-27-DE-001]

Roessler quotes a witness:

In Arab Punar, a German-speaking Turkish Major explained to me: I and my brother have each brought an Armenian girl with us from Ras ul Ain. We found them on our journey. We are very "angry" with the Germans for doing this sort of thing. When I contradicted him he said: Our general staff officer is a German, v. d. Goltz is a Commander and so many German officers are in our army … . In Nuss Tell, a Muslim supervisor said similar things to an accountant (Elias Salfetty). When I took him to task in the presence of others, he replied, "Effendim, it is not just me who is saying such things, everyone here is saying the same." [1915-07-27-DE-001]

The administrator Scheubner-Richter writes:

While driving through the countryside, I have often been asked by large landowners, whose guest I was, why the German government induced the Turkish government to act in such a manner towards the Armenians. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

Ambassador Hohenlohe-Langenburg:

On several occasions Turkish officers, clergymen and other persons in the interior have pronounced that we are the instigators of these atrocities. [1915-08-11-DE-011]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann reports from Aleppo:

Moreover, agreement of Germany to this mass murder is being assumed not only by all Christians, but also by the Muslim population of the country, partly with approval, but also with disapproval. These occasionally refer to Germany’s example (Belgium!). [1915-10-18-DE-011]

The German Protestant Christians write in their petition to the Imperial Chancellor:

It is not just the Entente press, but also public opinion in neutral countries which views Germany as being jointly responsible for the internal events in Turkey. Certainly, on this point the influence of German diplomacy upon the Porte is overestimated. But the impression which still remains is that Germany, after the neutralisation of the Entente powers, was the only power in the Bosporous which came into question to prevent the slaughtering of Christians. … The tarnishing of German honour, even with the suspicion of joint responsibility for the previously mentioned scandalous acts, must be prevented. [1915-11-10-DE-011]

Mordtmann, the German consul general who was entrusted with reporting on the Armenians in Turkey, noted after a discussion with the Swedish nun, Alma Johansson, who was in the service of the “German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient”:

Official circles in Musch, Mesere-Harput and Siwas unanimously believe that the persecutions and elimination of the Armenians was urged upon the Turkish Government by the Germans. [1915-11-06-DE-012]

The administrator Scheubner-Richter:

The Turks, among them also Turkish officers, have spread the news and in many cases actually believe it themselves, that the German government arranged for the extermination of the Armenians. [1915-11-09-DE-011]

Ambassador Wolff-Metternich reports to the Foreign Office that it was being spread in the country

that the Germans actually wanted these massacres. [1915-12-07-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann writes from Alexandrette:

There can be no doubt that in this country itself, the non-Armenian Christian - both foreign and local - population, which has witnessed the deportations, is convinced of Germany’s complicity and its complete indifference to the atrocities, which, with very few exceptions, people detest - for all their aversion to the Armenians ... The Muslims are also accepting this same argument of German consent. But the large majority, provided they think at all, seem to be thankful to us for allowing this radical ”operation”.
There can be no doubt that in this country itself, the non-Armenian Christian - both foreign and local - population, which has witnessed the deportations, is convinced of Germany’s complicity and its complete indifference to the atrocities, which, with very few exceptions, people detest. ... The Muslims are also accepting this same argument of German consent. But the large majority, provided they think at all, seem to be thankful to us for allowing this radical ”operation”. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

Hoffmann also reports on the opinion of his colleague Holstein from Mossul:

Unfortunately, according to statements made to me by Vice-Consul Holstein and other reliable persons, the Muslims also seem to have found our tolerance natural, partly because we ”would not have acted any differently in Belgium”. Finally, the Armenians themselves are, of course, generally convinced of our complicity, even of our instigation. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

Vice-Consul Hoffmann quotes a German officer who had been given a description of the murder of entire trains of Armenians by an Arab, and who added:

Germany was indeed very strong! In former times, the Turks would never have dared to wipe out a people like this. [1916-08-29-DE-001]

Count Spee, the German consul in Smyrna, which today is known as Izmir, writes on the deportation of the Armenians from his town:

A rumour is going around the town that the scheduled procedure has been planned by the Germans so that in this way they can get rid of their Armenian competitors who were troublesome for their trade. [1916-11-13-DE-001]

Ernst I. Christoffel, the head of the Home for the Blind in Malatia, reports to the embassy:

It is incredibly difficult for us German missionaries that Germany is regarded by Christians and Mohammedans as being the originator of these atrocities. This opinion is being fed and fortified from the Turkish side. [1917-07-14-DE-001]

Karl Axenfeld, the director of the Orient- and Islam-Commission of the German Protestant Mission-Board:

To our knowledge, of all the slander which has been spread against Germany none has achieved such a fateful lasting effect as that which states that Germany is the hidden instigator of the Armenian horrors. [1918-02-11-DE-001]

2) Protests against a German Involvement in the Genocide

While those Germans responsible greatly restrained themselves in their official diplomatic moves against the genocide, they noticeably intensified their protests against claims of a German joint responsibility. Undersecretary of State Zimmermann sent a telegram to Wangenheim:

Our friends in the Turkish Cabinet will understand that we are seriously interested in the forceful suppression of the excesses, mainly because of our being accused of instigation. The strong sense for humanness and culture which is characteristic of the Turkish method of warfare, in contrast to that of the enemy, provides us with the guarantee that our ally will establish the same principles within the affairs of the interior. [1915-07-27-DE-001]

Ambassador Hohenlohe-Langenburg reports to his Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg

that among the Turkish population of the Interior many believe that the German government is in agreement with the extermination of the Armenians and was even the instigator of it. [1915-08-12-DE-001]

The German embassy informs the Ottoman government in a memo that in view of the continuing deportations it

feels obliged to issue new warnings against these acts of violence and to renounce any responsibility for the consequences that could arise from them. It feels even more obliged than ever to draw the attention of the Ottoman government to this point as public opinion tends to believe that Germany in its capacity as a friend and ally of Turkey approved of these acts of violence or even instigated them. [1915-08-12-DE-001]

From Secretary of State Jagow to his ambassador in Constantinople:

In both hostile and neutral countries abroad people do not stop making us responsible for the actions of the Turkish authorities. As Mr. von Scheubner’s report again confirms, there is a widespread conception even among large parts of the Turkish population that Germany incited Turkey to persecute the Armenians. We believe that, in view of the Porte’s loyalty towards its German allies, we may expect it to emphatically counter such rumours. [1915-11-29-DE-001]

Wolff-Metternich reports to Berlin that he discussed with the Grand Vizier

the impropriety, which can be blamed upon low-ranking Turkish civil servants, of making the false assertion, that the Germans are aiding and abetting the Armenian persecutions. This slander, as I know irrefutably from travellers and other sources, is extremely widespread in Anatolia. We are not of a mind to share the responsibility for the Turkish government’s Armenian policies. Therefore, I requested that he take vigorous action to counter these rumours. The Grand Vizier was unaware of such rumours. He promised quite emphatically to have them denied. [1915-12-09-DE-001]

A week or so later Wolff-Metternich spoke to Talaat and reported to the Imperial Chancellor:

I then broached the subject with the Minister of the rumours that are widely circulated in Anatolia, whereby it is said that the German government had been in favour of the Armenian persecution. He replied, that as a result of my discussion with the Grand Vizier concerning this situation he had ordered all the relevant departments to take measures to counter these rumours, and to explain that the German government had had nothing whatsoever to do with the matter and that the Turkish government carried the sole responsibility for the measures taken against the Armenians. [1915-12-18-DE-001]

3) German Settlement Plans for Armenians along the Baghdad Railway Line?

Germany’s most important economic project in the Ottoman Empire was the Baghdad railway which, at the outbreak of the war, had been completed as far as Nusaybin, today a town on the border to Syria, but which was not able to run the entire distance, because important parts through the mountains were missing which had to be connected by tunnels. But many Armenians settled along a part of the Baghdad railway line, especially in Kilikien, and these people also made up an important part of the staff of this prestigious German project. Early on, the Catholicos of all the Armenians had recommended these Armenians to the care of the Germans. After a visit to Etchmiadzin, the German consul in Erzerum at that time reported that Kevork V. had said to him:

He hoped that the Imperial Government would continue to offer its protection to the Armenians, especially in the area around the Baghdad railway line, and he hoped that the Armenians residing there would have great advantages with regard to civilization and culture from the extension of the railway. [1913-09-26-DE-001]

There were, however, also indications concerning plans with the Armenians which went much further, although these were deleted in the Lepsius edition. Scheubner-Richter, the administrator, writes:

In educated Turkish and Armenian circles it is said that Professor Rohrbach pointed out during a lecture for the emperor that the Armenians are a very suitable element for populating the only minimally inhabited regions of Mesopotamia situated along the railway line to Baghdad. The German government then induced the Turkish government to resettle the Armenians there. [1915-08-05-DE-002]

Tyszka, the German journalist, also mentions this delicate subject and writes:

The Turkish plan of forcing all Armenians out of the provinces and relocating them in Mesopotamia has been superseded according to a brochure by Dr. Rohrbach. [1915-10-01-DE-001]

In his notes for the 86^th session of the Budget Committee of the Reich on 29 September 1916, Zimmermann does not speak of these plans in detail, but writes generally:

The re-settlement was originally supposed to take place in the nearer parts of Syria such as Huma and Damascus, followed by places in the Euphrates valley and finally Ras-ul-Ain and Mossul.
The re-settlement was originally supposed to take place in the nearer parts of Syria such as Huma and Damascus, followed by places in the Euphrates valley and finally Ras-ul-Ain and Mossul. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

There is a similar passage in his notes for a discussion with the Grand Duchess of Baden at the end of September 1916:

In the northern part of Mesopotamia, far from the militarily threatened borders, the Armenians were supposed to be allocated to new settlements. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

4) The Baghdad Railway and its Armenian Employees

The Armenian employees of the Baghdad Railway are also only mentioned in passing in the Lepsius documents, and only in a very fragmentary way. With regard to his administrative district, eastern Kilikien, Vice-Consul Hoffmann writes:

The employees of the Baghdad Railway and the Baghdad Railway Building Company have been spared so far, but I do not know whether this also applies to those of the Anatolian Railway. [1916-01-03-DE-001]

Further indications of the deportation of the Armenian employees are only given through telegrams which have been passed on. Thus, the Anatolian Railway Company reports

that due to the expulsion of Armenian workers, which led to the flight of Turkish workers and, thus, a total of five thousand three hundred men, Amanus was left with only 2900 workers. A further reduction in the number of workers due to continuing expulsion will definitely take place. … A counter-order which was given a few days ago by the local Ministry of War after our protests seems to have been unsuccessful. … As 2 Armenian doctors and 43 chemists and male nurses were also expelled, the sick are lying in the hospitals of Yarbashi, Entilli and Bagshe without any care which, considering the present epidemic, is extremely dangerous. [1916-06-19-DE-003]

Two days later, the next telegram came in on the teleprinters of the German embassy:

Today, the Minister of War sent a telegraphic order to the Commander of the 4 ^th Army and the Wali from Adana that expelled Armenians were to be sent back to their place of work. [1916-06-21-DE-001]

And again a day later:

Received the following urgent telegram, dated today: Gouverneur gé néral déclare n’avoir pas reçu ordre pour retour des expulsés mais seulement pour restreindre nombre des gens à expulser encore. Vali déclare en outre ne vouloir pas donner suite à pareil ordre quand même qu’il recevrait; un autre vali peut le faire ajoutait-il. [1916-06-22-DE-001]

The last report (in the Lepsius documents) is from the spring of 1917:

Lately, expulsions of Armenians have begun. Building department two reports expulsion since eighteenth Amanus stretch of 505 workers with 187 family members. Supposedly, Taurus will have the same figure. [1917-03-25-DE-001]

In the final document published, Lepsius permits the Chairman of the Baghdad Railway Company, Franz J. Guenther, to go into great detail in a letter to the Board of Directors:

As you will remember, we had to hold our own in arguments in order to keep our Armenian employees so that they could carry on working on our railway lines. The most critical period was in August 1915 when the Turkish government suddenly began one day to implement its intention to forcefully send our Armenian employees – about 850 of them – together with their families to the more remote regions of the empire. … It then became a very difficult task to change the postponement into a revocation of the measures against our Armenian employees; … we carried out this task successfully despite much strong pressure which was constantly renewed. During the past few days a deputation of our Armenian employees approached us and stated that only now did they have the freedom to inform us of what they had been feeling more and more intensely since 1915, namely, that they and their families had only kept their lives and their existence thanks to our firm intervention at that time. … A few days after this deputation approached us, the Armenian Patriarch sent a man as his representative to us. … He thanked me in the name of the Patriarch and the entire Armenian people for my intervention on behalf of our Armenian employees and their families. The Armenian nation had to pay off a debt of thanks. [1918-11-05-DE-001]

(V) German Attempts at Justification

Undersecretary of State Zimmermann’s notes for the 86^th session of the Budget Committee of the Reich on 29 September 1916 are about the only document in the files selected by Lepsius which justifies the German point of view on the Armenian genocide:

In December 1914 there were already riots on the part of the Turks against the Armenians in Erzerum. We gave the matter our immediate attention and ordered our Ambassador to protest at the Porte and to point out the dangers that could arise for Turkey from the repetition of such occurrences. ... The fact that the evacuation did not proceed as well as would have been possible in other countries, is quite understandable. The whole of the internal organisation failed. There were not enough roads, means of transport, money and in particular food. In addition there was of course the fanaticism of the Turks and their hatred, which to a certain degree was justified by the acts of treason and the disloyalty of the Armenians. ... The deportations took a deplorable course.
The sad events are generally well-known. But the Entente, England, France and Russia are mainly to blame for this. At this point I remember an article in the Daily Chronicle in September 1915, that was full of praise and recognition of the fact that the Armenian people, from the beginning of the war onwards, had accepted the matter of the Entente as their own, from the very beginning had fought on the side of the Entente uncompromisingly and had a right to be considered as the seventh ally of the Entente. The article is signed: The seventh Ally!
In the Armenian question, from the very beginning, we have lodged forceful protests with the Sublime Porte. … I can tell you in confidence that our Ambassador has gone as far as to incur the direct displeasure of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. After the first three months of his office, the ministers concerned said that the Ambassador appeared to have nothing better to do than to annoy them with the Armenian issue.
... I can only say that we have done everything we could. The only other extreme thing left for us would be to terminate our alliance with Turkey. You will understand that under no circumstances can we reach such a decision. Higher than the Armenians in our list of priorities, no matter how much we regret their fate from a purely humane point of view, are our sons and brothers who must shed their precious blood in the most dreadful battles and who are also dependent on the support of Turkey. [1917-05-09-DE-001]

(VI) The German Military

No aspect has been so rigorously deleted in the files published by Lepsius as the one concerning the participation of German officers in actions against the Armenians. In any case, military matters only played a minor role in those Foreign Office files which were concerned with the genocide. Thus, even in the adjusted version of the published files there are only a few indications on the role of German officers in the genocide.

Roessler, the consul in Aleppo, reports that in Zeitun the Turkish authorities acted harshly against Armenian deserters, possibly at the order of the Germans.

The inhabitants of Zeitun blame German officers with the implementation of conscription in their town .. and revile the German name. [1914-10-16-DE-001]

In his report on the suppression of the alleged riot in Zeitun, Roessler stated:

On the evening of 8 April, Fakhri Pasha arrived in Aintab and moved on to Marasch and Zeitun on the 10^th of the month. Count Wolfskeel, who is accompanying him, will know whether his inspections will produce good or bad results. [1915-04-12-DE-001]

Roessler writes to Ambassador Wangenheim:

While returning from Marash, I arrived in Aintab late in the evening of 8 April and learned that General Fakhri Pasha was in town, accompanied by the German Major Count Wolffskeel, in order to go on a tour of inspection of Marash, Zeitun and elsewhere. … I would like to add that Count Wolffskeel also accompanied Fakhri Pasha at the end of September during the military measures against the rebels near Suediye. I respectfully leave it to Your Excellency’s worthy consideration whether it is expedient that a German officer takes part in an expedition against an inner-Turkish enemy. [1915-10-25-DE-011]

Wolff-Metternich gives a further indication of the intervention by German military:

In the meantime, the difficulties which arose between the Syrian Christians near Mardin and Midiat and the Turkish authorities have been solved. The influence which GFM [Field Marshal] Baron von der Goltz was able to exert on a military level was useful to some extent. [1915-12-01-DE-011]

Reserve officer Scheubner-Richter, who was relieved as administrator, was confronted on his way to Persia with the problem of having to attack an Armenian village with alleged rebels. Scheubner-Richter:

I evaded the conflict I was threatened with ... by passing command of the Turkish troops entrusted to me to one of my Turkish officers, explaining that this was an “inner Turkish” matter and, thus, I did not consider it to be correct that Germans should have command of Turkish troops carrying out “gendarme service”. My conduct was later approved of by Field Marshal v. d. Goltz. [1916-12-04-DE-001]

There are only two episodes in the Lepsius documents in which it is proved that German officers did not take part in actions against the Armenians. Roessler reports on one of these:

Some weeks after my return von Marash, the head of the American mission in Aintab, Dr. Shepard, arrived here on his journey to Constantinople and told me the following story, among others:
A trek of banned Armenians was directed around Aintab without being allowed to enter the town. A female American missionary went out to distribute bread among them; in order to be as inconspicuous as possible, she wore the local traditional costume. Even before the banned had had enough to eat they were whipped into moving on by a gendarme officer, whereby the American lady was almost whipped herself. This gendarme officer looked like a German and was a German. I replied to Dr. Shepard that, quite apart from all other considerations such as the incompatibility of such an action with the honour of a German officer, as far as I knew there were no German gendarme officers in all of Turkey, but most certainly not in Vilayet Aleppo and the surrounding Vilayets. Upon his statement that it could also have been an army officer, I replied that no German officer would allow himself to be detailed for duty in the police service, such as the escort of banned Armenians. [1915-10-25-DE-011]

Kuehlmann, the Ambassador on Extraordinary Mission, writes with regard to a further episode:

In a longer excerpt from a publication by Lord Brice which was printed by the Greek newspaper Atlantis , published in New York, … he claims, among other things, that a German officer who was not specified in more detail played an active role in the slaughtering of the Armenian population from Musch in July 1915. … We have detailed information here from Sister Alma Johansson from the German Christian Charity-Organisation for the Orient on the events in Musch; she was on the spot on the critical days in question. In her description of these events she made not one mention of the presence of a German officer in the Turkish troops, and it cannot be assumed that she would have no knowledge of this or, had she heard of such a thing, that she would have concealed such knowledge from us. Further investigations by the local military mission then determined that, in July 1915, there were no Germans involved in the events in and around Musch. [1917-01-26-DE-001]